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INTRODUCTION

Personnel recovery is no longer limited to high-risk, specialized
troops as was the case in the past .... Isolated personnel now
include U.S. military, contractors and other government
civilians, as well as coalitionpartners.'
LTG Norton Schwartz
Providing adequate protection, antiterrorism (AT) 2 training
and, if necessary, personnel recovery3 for civilian contractors

1. Roxana Tiron, Pentagon Still Undecided on Polices to Protect Contractors,NAT'L

DEF., Nov. 2004, at 39.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 40 (2001,
amended edition 2005) (defining antiterrorism as "[diefensive measures used to reduce
the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response
and containment by local military forces") [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS]. "The proactive, preventative stage to stopping terrorism,

antiterrorism includes techniques designed to harden potential high-profile targets (e.g.,
government buildings or military installations), as well as actions taken to detect a
planned terrorist attack before it occurs." JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: THE
RULE OF LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 19 (Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company,

2004).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.2, PERSONNEL RECOVERY para. 3.1
(2000) (defining personnel recovery as the "aggregation of military, civil, and political
efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from
uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas"). The Defense Prisoner of
War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) defines personnel recovery as, "[tihe aggregation
of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated, or
missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas." DEF.
PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING PERS. OFFICE, PERSONNEL RECOVERY DEFINITION, DEFENSE
POW/MISSING
PERSONNEL OFFICE
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
FACT SHEET,
http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/personnel-recovery/fact-sheets.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006)
[hereinafter DPMO]. "Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by
non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government (USG)-approved action, and
diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options." Id. See also
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 409 (noting that
personnel recovery "includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat
search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion
and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options").
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deployed to support U.S. military operations presents significant
legal and policy challenges that both the military and civilian
contractor companies have yet to fully appreciate, let alone
properly institutionalize. Although many Americans still
visualize the U.S. military as a monolithic force of uniformed
personnel only, the reality is far different. Due to federally
imposed personnel limitations for the armed forces and the need
5
for specialized skills in the modern high-tech military,
hundreds of activities once performed by the military are now
privatized and outsourced to thousands of civilian contractors.6
These civilian contractors routinely provide a wide array of
important and essential activities in support of the full range of
militaryS operations
to include infrastructure improvements and
• 7
rebuilding. In other words, civilian contractors now work
shoulder-to-shoulder with military personnel during both armed
conflict and in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). s
While armed conflict refers to traditional combat operations
associated with internationally recognized warfare, MOOTWs
are contingency 9 missions that include activities such as

4. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-695, MILITARY OPERATIONS:
CONTRACTORS PROVIDE VITAL SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD PLANS (2003) (recommending that DOD adopt a series
of proposals to improve DOD supervision of support contractors including "(1) conducting
required reviews to identify mission essential services provided by contractors and
include them in planning; (2) developing and implementing the use of standard language
for contracts; and (3) developing comprehensive guidance and doctrine to help the
services manage contractors' supporting deployed forces") [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
5. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 135 (Maj. Derek I. Grimes ed., The Judge
Advocate General's Legal Center & School, 2005) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK].
6. Id. at 135. The term contractor personnel "does not include those persons who
reside in the country where the contract performance takes place." Id.
7. See Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying
Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend on Them, JOINT
SERVICES CONF. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Jan. 27-28, 2000, available at
http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPEOO/CampbellOO.html (noting that "[c]ontractor
support is an essential, vital part of our force projection capability-and [it is] increasing
in its importance").
8. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 57.
9. See DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 117
(defining a contingency as "[ain emergency caused by natural disasters, terrorists,
subversives, or by required military operations"). "Due to the uncertainty of the
situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure
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combating terrorism, counter-narcotic operations, peacekeeping
operations, and other high-risk missions around the globe.' °
One of the consequences of the global War on Terror" is that

the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment." Id.
10. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 57 (stating that MOOTW operations
include: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations,
Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones,
Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military
Support to Civilian Authorities, Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency,
Noncombat Evacuation Operations, Peace Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery
Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency).
11. The term "War on Terror" or "Global War on Terrorism" is used to describe the
ongoing global conflict between the United States of America and the al-Qa'eda terror
network founded by Osama bin Laden. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1348 (Sept. 20, 2001) (citing al-Qa'eda
and the nations that support that "radical network of terrorists" as the enemy in the
United States' "war on terror"). While it is now certain that the al-Qa'eda network
declared "war" on the United States in a 1996 "Fatwa," for most Americans the pivotal
moment in the conflict is traced to September 11, 2001, when nineteen members of the
terrorist al-Qa'eda organization hijacked four domestic U.S. passenger jet aircraft while
in flight (five terrorists in three of the planes and four in the fourth). See Terrorists
Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon in Raid With Hijacked Jets; Nation Stands in
Disbelief and Horror; Streets of Manhattan Resemble War Zone Amid Clouds of Ash,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2001, at Al (describing the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks)
[hereinafter Terrorists Destroy World Trade Center]; Evan Thomas, A New Date of
Infamy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 2001, at 22 (creating a timeline of the atrocities and
events that occurred on September 11, 2001); Nancy Gibbs, If You Want to Humble an
Empire, TIME, Sept. 14, 2001, at 32 (recounting the actions of leaders of the federal
government and New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001). The terrorists crashed two of the aircraft into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York. See Terrorists Destroy World Trade
Center, supra, at Al. A third plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., but the fourth
plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, most likely a result of the efforts of some of
the passengers. Id. at A12; see also Dave Barry, On Hallowed Ground, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 7, 2002 (chronicling the exploits of the passengers of United Airlines Flight 93, who
"transformed themselves from people on a plane into soldiers... [which] made them
heroes, immediately and forever, to a wounded, angry nation... that desperately
wanted to fight back"). According to a New York Times tally, along with billions of dollars
in property loss, approximately 3,047 were killed, not including the nineteen terrorists.
See A Nation Challenged;Dead and Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A13; see also
Thomas J. Lueck, City Compiles List of Dead and Missing From Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2002, at B1 (reporting on the New York City medical examiner's official list of
2819 people who were killed or missing in the attack on the World Trade Center,
prepared for the one-year observance at ground zero). The Bush Administration has
repeatedly indicated that the War on Terror also encompasses appropriate action against
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American and coalition contractors-particularly in Iraq 1 2 and
increasingly subjected to kidnappings,
Afghanistan 3 -are
torture, 14 and murder by terrorists, criminal elements, and other

those rogue States who pose a threat to the United States with the possession or desired
possession of weapons of mass destruction. See President George W. Bush, supra note
11, at 1349 (declaring "[firom this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or
support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime"). The
concern being that these dictatorships, like the current Iranian regime, might provide
weapons of mass destruction to terrorist operatives. See President George W. Bush,
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WKLY.
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 133, 135 (January 29, 2002) (proclaiming that "[t]he United States of
America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the
world's most destructive weapons"); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) (enumerating the socalled Bush Doctrine, which adopts the use of preemptive force in self-defense and is
designed to prevent the marriage of al-Qa'eda-styled terrorism with weapons of mass
destruction).
12. See Charles M. Madigan, Fast, Furious,Relentless Lightning-Quick Campaign
Ousts Hussein in 4 Weeks, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2003, at C1 (discussing the initial success
of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq). Dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, the multinational
operation in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, and major combat operations against
Saddam Hussein's forces ended on May 1, 2003. See Dana Milbank & Bradley Graham,
Bush Revises Views On 'Combat' in Iraq; 'MajorOperations' Over, President Says, WASH.
POST, Aug. 19, 2003, at A15 (reporting on President Bush's May 1, 2003, declaration that
"[m]ajor combat operations in Iraq [had] ended"); President George W. Bush, Address to
the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 516,
516 (May 1, 2003).
13. See, e.g., James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden Aide
Reported Killed by U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at Al. The multinational
military campaign to dislodge the Taliban and al-Qa'eda took less than three months,
from October 7, 2001 to December 23, 2001. See Michael R. Gordon, Gains and Limits in
a New Low-Risk War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at Al (noting that "[t]he military
campaign in Afghanistan was a striking success for a new style of warfare," which
"enabled the United States to topple the Taliban, install a friendly government and
ensure that Al Qaeda could no longer use Afghanistan as a base for terrorism");
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
Freedom-Operations,
Enduring
Military: Operation
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-ops.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2006) (further stating that approximately 6500 air combat missions were flown, which
attacked over 120 fixed targets). Four hundred vehicles were destroyed and an
undetermined number of combatants were killed. Id. The multinational military
campaign was dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom. Id.
14. See, e.g., Melinda Liu, *Help Me! I'm a Hostage!', NEWSWEEK, June 16, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8234978/site/newsweek/from/RL.5/ (reporting the rescue of a
kidnapped Australian contractor); Ellen Knickemeyer & Jonathan Finer, In Iraq, 425
Foreigners Estimated Kidnapped Since 2003, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at A28
(suggesting that abductions in Iraq are far more common than previously thought). See
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insurgency forces. 15 Without question, civilian contractors will
continue to be integral participants in the ongoing War on
Terror. 16 Therefore, it is imperative that issues of force
protection,17 AT training, and personnel recovery 18 be fully
delineated and the related legal contours be more clearly
defined. 19 This is particularly important in light of the ever-

Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17
B.C. INT'L & CoMP L. REv. 275, 290 (1994) (discussing the international community's
development of the concept of freedom from torture as "a core right which was not to be
compromised, even in times of public emergency"); see also United Nations Convention
Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/46
(Dec. 10, 1984) (defining torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity").
15. See, e.g., THOMAS HAMILL & PAUL T. BROWN, ESCAPE IN IRAQ: THE THOMAS
HAMILL STORY 4 (2004) [hereinafter THOMAS HAMILL STORY] (relating that "[rloadside
bombs, improvised from discarded Iraqi artillery shells and bombs-detonated by remote
control-and hit-and-run ambush with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic
weapons fire increasingly became hazards of the road").
16. Civilian contractors are now frequent victims of violence in war zones. See, e.g.,
Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29, 34
("Between January and August 2004... Triple Canopy teams came under attack 40
times, in incidents ranging from incoming rounds of rocket-propelled grenades to
assaults lasting at least 24 hours."); Jeffrey Gettleman, 4 From U.S. Killed in Ambush in
Iraq; Mob Drags Bodies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at Al (discussing the March 2004
ambush, killing, and mutilation of four American contractors working for Blackwater
Security Consulting Company). These contractors were providing security services for
food delivery operations in the Fallujah area of Iraq. Id. Noncontractor civilians also face
grave danger in war zones and hostile territories. See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Eunjung Cha,
American Beheaded on Web Video; Militants Say Killing Was Revenge for U.S. Abuses at
Iraqi Prison, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at Al (discussing the travels and subsequent
execution of Nicholas Berg, a twenty-six-year-old who journeyed to Iraq independently to
pursue potential business opportunities).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INST. NO. 3020.41, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
AUTHORIZED TO ACCOMPANY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES para. 4.4 (2005) [hereinafter DOD
INST. NO. 3020.41].
18. Id. para. 6.3.6.
19. Interestingly, a number of contracting firms have come out in support of
greater oversight and regulation of their activities by their own government and the
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evolving nature of terrorism and the attendant responses.
Both the Department of Defense (DOD) 21 and the companies
that provide civilian contractors have core moral and legal
responsibilities to provide contract personnel with adequate
22
security, AT training, and, in certain circumstances, rescue

United Nations, if necessary. Bergner, supra note 16, at 56. These firms would "like
checks on everything from adequate training to human rights violations. They'd like to
see their more rash competitors lose their contracts. They'd like to legitimize the work, to
remove the remainingstigma that their own men are rogues, mercenaries."Id. (emphasis
added).
20. There exists no universally accepted definition on terrorism, despite numerous
submissions of draft proposals by United Nations Commissions and Subcommissions
regarding the definition of terrorism. See e.g., 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 11-12, U.N. Doc
A/2693 (1954). The International Law Commission's 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954) contained the following proposed language at
Article 2, para. 6.: "The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of
terrorist activity in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State." Id.
Unfortunately, as of this writing, the U.N. General Assembly has not been able to reach
agreement on a final version. But see ADDICOrT, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the
intentional targeting of non-combatants is always a terrorist act regardless of the
underlying motivation or cause):
Since the victims of terrorism are invariably innocent civilians, it appears
fundamentally logical that a definitional approach should concentrate on the
act and not the political, religious, or social causes which motivate the act.
Under this regime, the use of violence on a civilian target with intent to
cause fear in a given civilian population is easily classified as a terrorist act.
In other words, to the common understanding of the general public,
terrorism is immediately associated with violence that is directed at the
indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians to create a climate of fear ....
In this light, bombings of public places, the sending of letter bombs or
poisons through the mails, hijackings of aircraft, hostage taking, and so on,
are all acts of terrorism regardless of the underlying cause said to justify the
attack. In a sense, terrorism can simply be described as making "war" on
civilians.
Id.
21. Rudi Williams, DOD Official Outlines Personnel-Recovery Work to Be Done, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV., Aug. 31, 2004 (quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Jerry D. Jennings that a pending National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) will
clarify policy "by directing the full integration of U.S. diplomatic, civil, and military
personnel recovery capabilities into a national architecture to ensure successful
outcomes for personnel-recovery events") (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.9.
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23

from capture. In tandem with identifying the legal and policy
considerations associated with these issues, this Article will also
address the matter of civil liability to the parent contracting
company should it fail to provide adequate protection, or
appropriate AT training, or both, to their civilian employees
serving overseas in hostile environments.2 4

II.

HISTORY AND STATUS OF CONTRACTORS ON THE
BATTLEFIELD

No one knows better than I the tremendous work that Brown and
Root 25 has done in Somalia. The flexibility and competence
demonstrated by your employees were key factors in allowing
U.S. forces to transitionlogistical support to the U.N.... 2 6

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The military's use of civilian defense contractors certainly
did not begin with the military campaigns and counter-terror
27
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.25 Since the inception of the
23. See Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture: Final Report, INST.
FOR DEF. ANALYSES, P-3890 July 2004 [hereinafter IDA Report]; see also GAO REPORT,

supra note 4; Dana Priest & Mary Pat Flaherty, Under Fire, Security Firms Form an
Alliance, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at Al (noting that "[u]nder assault by insurgents
and unable to rely on U.S. and coalition troops for intelligence or help under duress,
private security firms in Iraq have begun to band together... organizing what may
effectively be the largest private army in the world, with its own rescue teams and
pooled, sensitive intelligence").
24. See Williams, supra note 21. Hopefully, many of these issues will be resolved in
a pending National Security Presidential Directive set to be released in late 2005.
25. Brown and Root, a division of Halliburton, is a large government contractor
working especially in Iraq on a variety of reconstruction projects and other DOD support
operations. See Halliburton Iraq Contract Queried, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2950154.stm; Jane Mayer, CONTRACT SPORT,
What Did the Vice PresidentDo for Halliburton,THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 80.
26. David L. Young, Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield, ARMY
LOGISTICIAN, May-June 1999, at 10.
27. Most of the operations are directed at combating the al-Qa'eda terror
organization or like-minded extremists. Dedicated to the destruction of the West, alQa'eda has demonstrated over the past four years that it is truly international in scope
with the resources and personnel to coordinate sophisticated terror attacks on a scale
never before seen. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES xvi (2004) (describing
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American republic over 200 years ago, civilian contractors have
provided a wide array of essential goods and services to military
personnel operating both in garrison and in the field. 29 The role
of and need for contractor support began to expand greatly
during the war in Vietnam ° and has dramatically increased in
the War on Terror. 1 With the accelerated use of civilian
the terror network as "sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal") [hereinafter 9/11
REPORT]; Michael Elliott, Why the War on TerrorWill Never End, TIME, May 26, 2003, at
27, 29-30 (noting that the terror network of al-Qa'eda is linked to a vast variety of likeminded terrorist groups from the Philippines to Indonesia and has trained tens of
thousands of Arab and non-Arab militants in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime).
The al-Qa'eda organization is entrenched in Iraq under Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and still operates, although clandestinely, in Afghanistan. See Henry
2005,
Schuster, Al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Jordan, CNN, Nov. 12,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meastlllll/zarqawi.jordan/; Elliott, supra, at 29.
28. See P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military
Industry and Its Ramifications for InternationalSecurity, 26 INTL SECURITY 3, at 186,
188-90 (Winter 2001/2002).
29. See Campbell, supra note 7 (noting that the use of contractors during wartime
spans all the way back to the Revolutionary War, when General "Washington used
civilian wagon drivers to haul supplies"). It should be noted that most contracting
companies reject the accusation that they are mere mercenaries. See Bergner, supra note
16, at 31 (noting that security contracting companies, placing great importance on public
perception of their work, prefer the term "private security company," or P.S.C., over less
accurate and politically charged terminology).
30. See James J. McCullough & Abram J. Pafford, Contractors on the Battlefield:
Emerging Issues for Contractor Support in Combat & Contingency Operations, in
BRIEFING PAPERS, June 2002, at 1 (West 2002); see also Campbell, supra note 7
(explaining that "[b]y Vietnam, contractors were becoming a major part of logistical
capabilities within zones of operation providing construction, base operations, water and
ground transportation, petroleum supply and... support for high-technology systems").
31. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-9; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-5, DOD FORCE MIX ISSUES: GREATER RELIANCE ON CIVILIANS IN
SUPPORT OF ROLES COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS (1994) (stating that "[w]ith
the transition to an all-volunteer active-duty military force, DOD adopted the 'Total
Force' policy in 1973, which recognized that the reserves, retired military members,
civilian government workers, and private contractor personnel could add to the active
forces in ensuring the national defense"); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at
Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549, 554 (2005) (noting that, in Iraq, the military relies on civilian
contractors "for unprecedented levels of battlefield and weaponry operation, support, and
maintenance"); Bergner, supra note 16, at 32 (reporting that, in 2002, the United States
hired a private security detail of roughly forty men from DynCorp to protect Afghan
President Hamid Karzai from attacks and assassination attempts). For example,
security contracting "businesses add about 16 percent to the coalition's total forces." Id.
at 31.
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contractors who accompany the military, the issue of status
looms as a central matter32of concern. Are they combatants,
noncombatants, or a hybrid?
A. Scope of ContractorSupport
Civilians accompanying military forces,33 also known in the
DOD lexicon as contractors deploying with the force (CDF),34 fall
into three broad categories, each governed by somewhat
different legal and regulatory guidance. These three categories
are: DOD civilian employees, 5 civilian contractor personnel, and
36
other nonaffiliated civilians. As the primary topic of interest of
these three categories, civilian contractor personnel includes:
"Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or
other legal nonfederal entity that enters into a contract directly
with the [DOD] to furnish services, supplies, or both, including
construction."37 In addition, many of the civilian contractors who
accompany the military on contingency operations are
designated as "mission-essential" (M-E) personnel 38 (similar to
the designation of DOD civilian employees as "emergencyessential" personnel). 39 In essence, an M-E contractor is someone

32. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1.
33. Many military publications refer to contractors accompanying the military
overseas as "CAF," an acronym for "Contractors Accompanying the Force." See OPLAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 135.
34. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 1.
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INST. No. 1300.23 (defining DOD civilian employees as
"U.S. citizens or foreign nationals employed by the [DOD] and paid from appropriated or
non appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement") [hereinafter DOD
INST. NO. 1300.231.
36. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F.
L. REV. 1, 4 & n.9 (2001) (describing nonaffiliated persons as the media,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs) refuges,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
[hereinafter Turner & Norton].
37. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. E1.1.2.
38. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INST. NO. 3020.37, CONTINUATION OF
ESSENTIAL DOD CONTRACTOR SERVICES DURING CRISIS (1990).
39. In contrast to civilian contractors, DOD civilian employees can be designated as
emergency-essential personnel. See U.S. DEP~T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1404.10,
EMERGENCY-ESSENTIAL (E-E) DOD U.S. CITIZEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES para. 6 (1992). An
E-E employee is expected to sign a "[DOD] Civilian Employee Overseas Emergency-
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who works in a position in an overseas contingency operation
that is required to ensure the success of the operation.
Given the scope and pace of the modern military, military
planners no longer consider civilian contractors a luxury or a
"nice to have" addition to the force structure.4 ° Indeed,
contractors accompanying the military on operations are a
necessity without which the modern military could not conduct
combat or engage in MOOTW. Because contractors now provide
a wide range of technical, logistical, maintenance, and security
support services to DOD missions, 4' America's unparalleled
military superiority now requires contractor support to maintain
military readiness and operational capabilities.
As noted,
governmental limits on the number of DOD personnel
authorized in a particular area,4 3 the increasing sophistication of
military technologies," and the ever-present need to conserve
DOD resources for other
S 45potential activities makes contractor
personnel support vital. Working for American contractor
companies under DOD contracts, thousands of engineers,
technicians, construction workers, food service providers, and

Essential Position Agreement." Id. para. E2.1.4.
40. See Campbell, supra note 7 (arguing that contractor support to the military is
an absolutely essential part of force projection).
41. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-5, supra note 31, Ch.

0:2.
42. See Anthony Bianco & Stephanie Anderson Forest, Outsourcing War, BUS.
WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 68 (highlighting that "[bly most estimates, civilian contractors
are handling as much as 20% to 30% of essential military support services in Iraq");
Matthew Quirk, PrivateMilitary Contractors:A Buyer's Guide, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Sept. 2004, at 39 (noting that there are ten times as many contractors per military
soldier in Iraq in 2004 as compared to the 1991 Gulf War).
43. Force Caps limit DOD personnel that may be committed to a particular
location, combat zone, or mission. See HEADQUARTERS DEPT OF THE ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 100-21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD para. 1-3 (2003), available at

http://www.afsc.army.milgc/files/fm3-100x21.pdf
[hereinafter FM 100-21] ("When
military force caps are imposed on an operation, contractor support can give the
commander the flexibility of increasing his combat power by substituting combat units
for military support units.").
44. Sophisticated weapons systems may require contractors to operate the system,
train military personnel on their operation, or both. But see infra footnotes 108-20 and
accompanying text (noting that contractors may not operate weapons systems).
45. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4.
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weapon specialists make up a "privatized Army. 46 This
privatized Army is currently deployed closer than ever before to
imminently dangerous areas, including the actual battlefield.47
To be sure, this fact has resulted in untoward consequences.
Tragically, as of January 2005, over 200 civilian contractors
working in Iraq (many of them Americans) have been killed,
with hundreds more wounded.48
Furthermore, relative to the size of the uniformed armed
forces during the Cold War, today's active duty military is a
significantly smaller force. 49 This increases the importance of
contractor support to maintain the overall flexibility of the
active and reserve forces.5 ° While no one really knows exactly
how many civilian contractors are currently supporting DOD
contingency operations overseas,5 1 low ranging estimates reveal

46. Mark Fineman, PrivatizedArmy in Harm's Way, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at
Al (noting that "[t]housands of unarmed American engineers, technicians, electricians,
weapons specialists and retired military officers working for U.S. corporations under
Defense Department contracts are deployed closer to present and imminent war zones
than ever before").
47. Id.
48. See Joseph Neff & Jay Price, Iraq: Courts to Resolve Contractor'sDeaths, NEWS
& OBSERVER, Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11781;
but see Bergner, supra note 16 (noting the impossibility of accurately reporting how
many security contractors have been killed in Iraq due to a failure on the part of
contracting companies to report the deaths). Still, experts estimate that between 160 and
200 security contractors have been killed in Iraq-"more deaths than any one of
America's coalition partners have suffered." Id. In addition, "[tihere have been more than
150 reported kidnappings in [Iraq] in the last year, most of them involving Iraqi
citizens." Solomon Moore, U.S. ContractorKidnapped in Iraq; His Identity, That of Firm
Withheld, LA. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A3.
49. See Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing
the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 111 (2001) (noting that the armed forces size has been
reduced from 2,174,200 to 1,385,700 following the end of the Cold War); see also
generally Edward F. Bruner, Military Forces: What is the AppropriateSize for the United
States? (CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ORDER CODE RS 21754,
May 28, 2004), availableat www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf.
50. See Schooner, supra note 31, at 561-64 (2005) (arguing that the military is not
providing proper oversight to some contractors and that the line between inherently
governmental functions and commercial activities is improperly blurred); see also
Bergner, supra note 16 (noting that security contractors, despite denials from the
Pentagon, often find themselves "perform ling] inherently military functions" due to
inadequate numbers in the U.S. fighting force in Iraq).
51. However, the DOD has mechanisms in place for making such a determination.
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that in Iraq alone there is approximately one civilian contractor
for every ten active duty military personnel.5 2 This amounts to
53
over 20,000 civilian contractors, a number sure to increase over
the next few years as the pace of infrastructure support in Iraq
(and Afghanistan) increases. 4
All civilian contractors operate under the terms of a specific
55 either directly with the DOD or as subcontracted with
contract,
another contractor who is under contract with the DOD. The
duties of all contractors are "established solely by the terms of
their contract."56 Usually, the military contract will fall into one
of three general categories. 7 First, Theater Support Contracts8
are contracts associated with providing support 9 to the regional
combatant command,6 ° for instance, in Colombia, the combatant

See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Contractor Personnel
Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,790 (Dep't of
Def. May 5, 2005) §§ 252.225-7040 (g)-(h) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 207, 212, 225,
252) [hereinafter DFARS] (requiring contractor's input to personnel data list as well as a
plan for replacing employees who are unavailable for deployment or need to be replaced
during a deployment).
52. See Fineman, supra note 46.
53. See Quirk, supra note 42 (noting that there are "ten times as many
[contractors] per military soldier" in Iraq in 2004 as compared to the 1991 Gulf War).
However, the actual number of civilian contractors on the ground in Iraq is subject to
dispute. Compare id. (speculating that there are roughly 20,000 civilians in Iraq) with
Bergner, supra note 16 (estimating that the number of unarmed civilians assisting the
U.S. military's efforts in Iraq ranges from 50,000 to 70,000, without counting the 25,000
armed contractors) and Tom Regan, US Troops, Security Contractors Increasingly at
Odds in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June
13, 2005, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0613/dailyUpdate.html (claiming that there are between
50,000 and 100,000 civilian contractors in Iraq, with "over 20,000 of them providing
private security").
54. See Guy Taylor, Legal Limbo Shadows Civilians in War Zone, WASH. TIMES,
July 6, 2004, at Al (noting that "lawyers and representatives from contract firms... put
the number closer to 80,000").
55. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.4.
56. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-6.
57. See Campbell, supra note 7.
58. See id. (describing theater support contractors as those "usually from the local
vendor base, providing goods services and minor construction to meet the immediate
needs of operational commanders").
59. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.
60. See DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 96
(defining combatant command as "[a] unified or specified command with a broad
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command is United States Southern Command. These contracts
are typically for day-to-day recurring services at the deployed
site, to include minor construction projects, repair parts, and
equipment rental.6 ' The second type of contracts are called
External Support Contracts and are awarded by commands
outside the pertinent combatant command, 2 such as the Defense
Logistics Agency. s3 Again, under these contracts civilian
contractors are expected to provide services at the deployed
locations.r Finally, Systems Contracts-the third category of
contracts-provide the required logistics support to maintain
and operate weapons systems and various mechanical systems
used in the field.65 Regardless of the type of contract, the
realities of military exigencies necessitate that civilian contract
personnel "shall be prepared to respond rapidly, efficiently, and
effectively to meet mission requirements for all contingencies
and emergencies .66

Furthermore, some contracts may require contractor
personnel to be U.S. citizens, reflecting a security consideration

continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the
President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and further noting that "[c]ombatant commands
typically have geographic or functional responsibilities").
61. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 3; FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-8.
62. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 3 ("[External support contractors] work under
contracts awarded by contracting officers serving under the command and procurement
authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater. Their support augments the
commander's organic combat service support capability."); see also FM 100-21, supra
note 43, para. 1-9.
63. The Defense Logistics Agency is the DOD's "largest combat support agency,
providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime to the military
services as well as several civilian agencies and foreign countries." DEFENSE LOGISTICS
AGENCY, FACTS AND FIGURES, ABOUT THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.dla.mil/public-info/facts.asp. The Defense Logistics Agency "supplies almost
every consumable item America's military services need to operate, from groceries to jet
fuel" and has supported the U.S. military in "every major war and contingency operation
of the past four decades," starting with the Vietnam war. Id.
64. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-9.
65. See id. para. 1-10.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1400.31, DoD CIViLIAN WORK FORCE
CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION para. 4.1 (1995), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d140031_O42895/d140031p.pdf.
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associated with intelligence concerns or other sensitive issues.
In fact, vetting contractors who might have access to particular
DOD military sites is a necessary force-protection measure. 6 For
example, the threat posed by in-country contractors with regular
access to coalition military facilities was vividly demonstrated in
December 2004, at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in
Mosul, Iraq. In this tragic incident a suicide bomber penetrated
base security measures and killed twenty-two people, 9 including
several civilian contractors. ° While the suicide bomber was not
a civilian contractor-he was most likely a terrorist who
disguised himself in an Iraqi military uniform'-the event

67. 48 C.F.R. § 3052.237-70(a) (2003) (defining "Sensitive Information"). Citizenry
or residency requirements for contract personnel are not uncommon throughout the
military, homeland security, and law enforcement communities of the federal
government. In December 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) passed an
interim rule requiring that some DHS contractors "be a citizen of the United States of
America, or an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence...."
§ 3052.237-70(e).
68. While the primary bulk of force protection measures at DOD installations
prepare for external threats, safeguarding personnel and military assets from rogue
contractors is equally important. The so-called "Insider Threat" scenario occurs when an
individual is granted legitimate access to a location and then uses that access to
facilitate sabotage or violence. Because the DOD often uses local contractors to provide
food, housekeeping, maintenance, and even security services, preventing a hostile from
gaining employment under the cover of a contract-and then using that access to a DOD
installation to facilitate violence-is a security challenge that pits the necessities of
safety and access control against the needs of military exigency, readiness, and incountry support. See Karl Vick, Iraq Base Was Hit By Suicide Attack, U.S. General Says;
Bomber Penetrated Tightly Secure Area, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at Al (describing
the fact that "U.S. firms contracted to feed the troops routinely employ citizens from
third countries, such as the Philippines, but Iraqis come on base each day to fill
temporary jobs and or do construction work, such as building").
69. See George Edmonson, Evidence Points to Suicide Bomber; Base Infiltrator
Likely Wore Device Packed with Shrapnel, U.S. Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 23,
2004, at Al (noting that four Halliburton employees were killed in the blast, including
two from Texas, where Halliburton is based).
70. See Bill Nichols & Dave Moniz, Suicide Bomber Blamed in Blast, USA TODAY,
Dec. 23, 2004, at Al (noting that the December 22, 2004 suicide bombing inside a mess
hall at a U.S. base near Mosul would result in "a reassessment of U.S. security
procedures . ..."
71. See Jackie Spinner, Bomber Likely in Iraqi Uniform; U.S. Officials Offer Theory
in Deadly Attack on Mess Tent, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at A14 (explaining that "Iraqi
soldiers.., are often present on U.S. bases... enabling[ing] a bomber dressed in a
uniform to move about without raising suspicion").
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illustrated the fact that a non-American civilian who falsely
gained employment under the pretense of an in-country
contractor could accomplish the same act of terrorism.
72
While the United States clearly adopts international law
prohibiting contractors from engaging in hostilities,7 3 the reality
is that contractors can be deployed throughout the battlefield,
including forward-deployed positions (relative to enemy forces)
to support operations during armed conflict or in other hostile
environments associated with contingency operations 4 As
evidenced by contractor casualties at the FOB Mosul attack,75
civilian contractors are regularly exposed to the risks of physical
harm similar to that of military personnel.16 An enemy that
blends in with the civilian population is far more able to employ
violence against support and civilian contract personnel. To
prepare for the physical dangers inherent in such asymmetrical
conflicts, contractors must be properly informed, trained, and
equipped 77 not only to understand their own rights and
obligations, but also to understand those of the U.S. military
78
and the parent contractor company.
B. Status of Contractors
Unlike
military
personnel,
civilian
contractors
accompanying the armed forces in the field do not fit neatly into
well-defined arenas of military law and procedure. While the
military has always carefully outlined its own command
structure for its uniformed personnel, for civilians accompanying
the forces the picture is far less certain. In fact, except in a
72. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1.
73. See JOINT PUBLICATION 4-0, DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF JOINT
OPERATIONS, at V-1 (2000) [hereinafter JP 4-01 ("In all instances, contractor employees
cannot lawfully perform military functions and should not be working in scenarios that
involve military combat operations where they might be conceived as combatants.").
74. James E. Manker, Contractors in Contingency Operations: Panacea or Pain,
A.F. J. OF LOGISTICS (2004), available at http://www.fmdarticles.com/p/articles/
mi mOibo/is_3 28/ain9544154/print.
75. See Vick, supra note 68 (noting that four of the 22 deaths in the blast were
American civilians).
76. Manker, supra note 74.
77. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4.
78. See generally Campbell, supra note 7; FM 100-21, supra note 43.
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Congressional declaration of war (which last occurred in 1941
during World War II), civilian contractors are not subject to the
provisions of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
that is, military law. 79 Not only do military commanders have
extremely limited authority to take any type of direct
disciplinary action against contractors to make them perform
their duties,8 ° contractors are generally not required to do
anything outside of the terms of their specific contract.8 ' Simply
stated, commanders must look to the contracting officer 82 for
enforcement of the terms of the contract.83 DOD Instruction
3020.41 in paragraph 6.1.1 entitled, "International Law and
Contractor Legal Status" states:
Under applicable law, contractors may support military
operations as civilians accompanying the force, so long
as such personnel have been designated as such by the
force they accompany and are provided with an
appropriate identification card under the provisions of
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War ....
If captured during armed
conflict,
contingency
contractor
personnel
79. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-6.
80. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supranote 17, para. 6.3.3.
81. Civilian contractors may be subject to the host nation laws or be prosecuted for
certain criminal offenses by the Department of Justice under the provisions of the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 3261, as amended by
§ 1008 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004). See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 36, 38;
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); Contractor Performance
of Security-Guard Functions, 70 FR 14,576-01 (Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R.
pt. 237).
82. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 225.7402-3(b) (describing the duties of the
contracting officer to include confirming the contract contains valid terms of agreement
between the parties).
83. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, at para. 6.3.3. Commanders may
take administrative actions against civilian contractor to include revocation of security
clearances or restriction from installations or facilities. Commanders have limited
authority to take direct action against contractor personnel to perform their duties. In
addition, only Department of Justice may prosecute misconduct. Contractor personnel
are normally disciplined by the contractor through the terms of the applicable
employment agreement. However, contracts should recognize the ability for a
commander to take certain actions affecting contractor personnel such as the ability to
revoke or suspend security clearances and restriction from installations or facilities. See
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the force are entitled to prisoner of war
accompanying
4
status.8
The reason for this dilemma revolves around the exact
nature of the civilian contractor vis-A-vis the concept of armed
conflict. To begin with, traditional international law has focused
sharply on the distinction between international and internal
armed conflict with most of the concern to the former. Even
under the international laws of war, the precise status of
contractors is still the subject of some debate.85 The current
corpus of the law of war,8 6 which consists of all laws created by
treaty and customary principles 87 that are applicable to
international warfare, is largely encompassed by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.8 8 The Geneva Conventions serve as the primary
89
source of law in the event of an international armed conflict.
While the Geneva Conventions require all militaries to
distinguish
between
combatants
(armed
forces)
and

84. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1.
85. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that not all civilian
contractors will be afforded protection upon capture, under the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War). Phillip Carter, Hired Guns: What to Do
About Military Contractors Run Amok, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2098571.
86. The basic goal of the law of war is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of war
by: "[1] [p]rotecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering;, [2]
[slafeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and [3]
[flacilitating the restoration of peace." DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANuAL 27-10, THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE para. 2 (1956).
87. Customary international law consists of all those binding norms practiced by
nations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
88. The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
89. See John Cerone, Status of Detainees in InternationalArmed Conflict, and
Their Protection in the Court of Criminal Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2002,
availableat http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh8l.htm.
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noncombatants (civilians), 90 civilian contractors are neither
combatants nor noncombatants in the traditional sense of the
terms. Contractors are simply civilians that are authorized to
accompany regular military forces on assorted military
operations, including in times of international armed conflict
(the United States' policy is to handle all hostile adversaries
consistent with the spirit and terms of the Geneva Conventions
irrespective of the nature of the conflict). 9'
When taking a broader meaning of the term "noncombatant", that is, the general civilian population, the concept
actually embraces "certain categories of persons who, although
members of or accompanying the armed forces, enjoy special
protected status, such as medical officers, corpsmen, chaplains,
technical (i.e., contractor) representatives, and civilian war
correspondents."92 In fact, the Geneva Conventions provide that
prisoner of war (POW) protected status is given to "[p]ersons
who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the
armed forces . . . ."9 Thus, contractors are viewed as separate

90. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 4-49; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.3,
(1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]. The term combatant and noncombatant
have special implications on the battlefield, especially in the context of prisoner-of-war
(POW) status.
91. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040. This clause requires parent
contracting companies to ensure that its deployed personnel are familiar with and
comply with:
1.
United States, host country, and third country national laws;
2.
Treaties and international agreements;
3.
United States regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and
procedures; and
4.
Orders, directives, and instructions issued by the Combatant
Commander relating to force protection, security, health, safety, or
relations and interaction with local nationals.
Id. § 252.225-7040(d).
92. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 90. If a noncombatant actively
participates in armed conflict he may lose his protected status and be deemed an illegal
combatant subject to criminal prosecution for war crimes. Id.
93. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(A)(4),
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from the general civilian population, and must be treated as
POWs if captured by enemy forces during an international
armed conflict.94
As long as the civilian contractor takes no direct part in
hostilities, he must be given POW status. 95 Still, this
noncombatant status does not insulate contractors from the
exigencies of the battlefield, including the possibility of capture,
injury, or death.96 This fact should always be stressed to civilian
contractors before they are assigned to work in hostile
environments outside of the United States.
Furthermore, with the defeat of the radical Taliban regime 97
and the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, a state of international
armed conflict no longer exists between the United States (and
its allies), and Afghanistan or Iraq. In this environment,
MOOTW, the protections of the Geneva Conventions are not
applicable. 98 In fact, the ongoing terrorist activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan would probably not even qualify as an internal
armed conflict. 99 Although one could argue that the basic

Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
94. See id. art. 4(B)(2).
95. Id.
96. See generally discussion, supra Part II.
97. For an excellent umbrella definition of a totalitarian regime, see JOHN NORTON
MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 61 (2d ed. 2005).
A radical totalitarian regime... seems to blend together a mixture of a
failing centrally planned economy, severe limitations on economic freedom, a
one-party political system, an absence of an independent judiciary, a police
state with minimal human rights and political freedoms at home, denials of
the right to emigrate, heavy involvement of the military in political
leadership, a large percentage of GNP devoted to the military sector, a high
percentage of the population in the military, leaders strongly motivated by
an ideology of "true beliefs" including willingness to use force, aggressively
anti-Western and antidemocratic in behavior, and selective support for wars
of national liberation, terrorism, and disinformation against Western or
democratic interests.
Id.
98. See infra note 99. But see U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5100.77, DOD
LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (1998) (generally believing that the law of war should be
applicable in all military operations; the United States will comply with the spirit and
associated principles of the law of war on all MOOTW).
99. The United States is not a signatory to Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1946, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of

2006]

CONTRACTORS ON THE "BATTLEFIELD"

protections associated with basic humanitarian law and human
rights law' °° would protect the captured contractor from abuse or
torture, the sad reality of the War on Terror is that civilian
contractors are often specifically targeted by terrorists who
recognize no law whatsoever and provide no distinction between
civilians and the military.1 ' Humanitarian law has no value to

International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Commonly known as
Protocol I, this instrument seeks to extend coverage of non-international conflicts "in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their rights to self-determination." Id. art. 1.4; see also
generally Abraham Sofaer, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 786 (1988) (arguing
generally that Protocol I's effect of "[t reating ...terrorists as soldiers ... enhances their
stature, to the detriment of the civilized world community").
100. The term "human rights" is commonly meant to include so-called first and
second-generation human rights. See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of
Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1997) (noting that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/819, Dec. 10, 1948, contains two Covenants consisting of "first" and "second"
generation human rights). Through treaty and customary international law, first
generation human rights are binding on all nation-states. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (listing first
generation human rights as: "[1] genocide, [2] slavery or slave trade, [3] the murder of, or
causing the disappearance of, individuals, [41 torture or other cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment, [5] prolonged arbitrary detention, [61 systematic
racial discrimination, and [7]a consistent pattern of committing gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights"). Second generation human rights are legally
binding only on those nation-states that have obligated themselves through treaty.
These rights speak to political and civil freedoms such as the freedom of religion,
peaceful assembly, privacy, association, fair and public trial, open participation in
government, and movement. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101 CONG REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(comments of Sen. Pell) reprinted in DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., SELECTED
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 282-83 (3d ed. 2001). Essentially second
generation human rights are the functional equivalents of democratic values found in
the United States Constitution.
101. See Bomb Kills 4 U.S. Security Contractors in Iraq, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 7,
2005 (reporting on the death of four American contractors from a roadside bomb outside
of Basra); see also THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 150. When captured by
terrorists in Iraq, Hamill noted that he was considered a solider by the terrorists:
"What do you do?" asked the well-dressed man [Iraqi terrorist].
"I am a civilian contractor," I replied.
"You are a soldier," pronounced the well-dressed man. "You haul supplies
and fuel to soldiers for the trucks, tanks, and planes that bomb Fallujah."
"You are a soldier!" said the man in the red wrap [Iraqi terrorist].
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terrorists. Thus, self-defense, AT training, and personnel
recovery policy are best viewed from the perspective of the
adversary. In other words, will the hostile forces abide by
102 the
applicable legal norms and standards of civilized behavior?
During MOOTW, either the normative law 10 3 of the host
nation or any applicable Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)
will determine the rights and privileges bestowed on civilian
contractors while they are present in the host nation (special
diplomatic arrangements may also exist for particular
deployments). 10 4 Unless a state of international armed conflict
exists or some other set of special circumstances exist (for
example, the United States serving in an occupation role as it
did in Iraq and Afghanistan), the use of civilian contractors will
be strictly limited by these parameters. 0 5 Again, as stated in the
June 2005 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS): "Contractor personnel are not combatants and shall
not undertake any role that would jeopardize their status.1 0 6

"No I am not a soldier," I said. "I am here to support the military. I am a
truck driver."
"You were driving military trucks, no?" said the well-dressed man.
"Yes, I was, but I am a civilian," I said.
"You are a soldier," he said.
Id.
102. See Evan Thomas & Stryker McGuire, Terror at Rush Hour, NEWSWEEK,
July 18, 2005, at 29 (discussing the continuing terror attacks aimed this time at civilians
in London on July 7, 2005).
103. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.2. CDF personnel remain
subject to U.S. law and regulations. Id. para. 6.1.3.
104. Id. para. 6.3.3. ("Contractor personnel are subject to the domestic criminal
laws of the [host nation] ... absent a SOFA or international agreement to the
contrary.").
105. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-34.
Typically, these agreements and laws affect contractor support by-Directing
the use of host-nation resources prior to contracting with external
commercial firms. Restricting firms or services to be contracted. Establishing
legal obligations to the host nation (e.g., customs, taxes, vehicle registration
and licensing, communications and facilities support, passports, inter- or
intracountry travel, mail, work permits, and hiring of local workers).
Prohibiting contractor use altogether.
Id.
106. DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(b)(3).
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III. FORCE PROTECTION

The responsibility for assuring that contractors receive adequate
force protection starts with the combatant commander, extends
downward, and includes the contractor.l7
Department of the Army Field Manual 100-21
Force protection0 8 does not consist of simply providing
armed military escorts to civilian contractors; instead, it is a
process of events that begins long before the civilian contractor
is deployed. 1 9 In recognition of this fact, force protection is
defined as "actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions
against DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical
information." 110 Thus, the process of force protection clearly
encompasses AT training to include such things as ensuring
that civilian contractors have "an understanding of [the] threat
and the development of a system of indications and warnings
that will facilitate a proactive, predictive response to enemy and
terrorist action." '
Force protection is a shared obligation by the military and
the contractor company, tempered by the restriction that while
accompanying the forces during an armed international conflict,
civilian contractors cannot conduct force protection measures
that would be tantamount to engaging in hostilities. 12 Further,
if armed contractors are used to provide security 1 3 during a
MOOTW, such activities must be spelled out in the contract and
[riequests for permission to arm contingency contractor
personnel to provide security services shall be reviewed

107. FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-4.
108. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4.
109. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-2. "Force protection and antiterrorism
measures are meant to confuse and deceive the enemy so that military forces and
accompanying civilian personnel are less vulnerable from attack." Id.
110. Id. para. 6-1.
111. Id. para. 6-2. "Force protection may include fortification construction,
electronic countermeasures, integrated air defense coverage, NBC [nuclear, biological
and chemical] defensive measures, and rear operations to include specific antiterrorist
actions." Id.
112. See id. paras. 6-1, 6-3.
113. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.5.
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on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate Staff Judge
Advocate to the geographic Combatant Commander to
ensure there is a legal basis for approval. The request
will then be approved or denied by the geographic
114
Combatant Commander ....
Although the responsibility for force protection "starts with
the combatant commander, extends downward, and includes the
contractor," 115 the exact extent of force protection afforded to the
contractors as a general class is not entirely clear. 16 Even the
recently adopted June 2005 DFARS on contractors deployed on
contingency operations offers only general guidance for the
Combatant Commander."' Of course, as a practical matter, the
military's failure to adequately protect the civilian contractor
may compromise the contractor's ability to perform the tasks (or
terms) of the contract, thereby hampering the ability of the
deployed military force to conduct operations. With the
continuing cycle of violence in Iraq, some contracting companies
have decided that the atmosphere is simply too dangerous and
have pulled out.118 For instance, in December 2004, American
contracting company Contrack International abandoned a $325
million contract in which they supervised a consortium that
rebuilt transportation infrastructure in Iraq."9 In making their
announcement to withdraw, a Contrack spokesman
confided
120
that "work [in Iraq] was too dangerous and costly."

114. Id. para. 6.3.5.1.
115. FM 100-21, supranote 43, para. 6-4.
116. See id.
117. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-740(c). "The Combatant Commander
will develop a security plan to provide protection, through military means, of Contractor
personnel engaged in [a] theater of operations unless [the] terms of the contract place
the responsibility with another party." Id.
118. See, e.g., Del Jones, Citing Security, U.S. ContractorPulls Out of Rebuilding
Project in Iraq, USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 2004, at A4 (reporting on the first instance of a
large American contractor withdrawing reconstruction efforts in Iraq, due to cost and
safety concerns).
119. See id.
120. Id. (reporting additionally that a company named Orascom, the Egyptian
parent for Iraq's primary mobile phone provider, was also thinking about withdrawing
from Iraq). Orascom Chairman Naguib Sawiris related that "I'm not into the business of
putting the lives of my people in danger." Id.
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A. Contractor'sUse of Firearms
As stated, if the contract allows, the military may position
civilian contractors anywhere in the theater of operations. While
they can never be used in "direct support" of hostile
operations,12 ' the dangers of the battlefield and the limitations of
the military to provide adequate force protection may subject
contractors to bodily harm, necessitating
the contractors'
122
possession of firearms for self-defense.
DOD policy 1 23 discourages contractor personnel from
possessing firearms for self-defense 124 (U.S. law does not
preclude the possession of firearms for DOD employees under
certain conditions1 25 ). If weapons are authorized, 1 26 they must be
a military specification sidearm (the 9mm automatic pistol)

121. See generally Turner & Norton, supra note 36. From a legal perspective, the
concept of direct support is not settled under either international law or U.S. policy.
While taking up arms to engage in combat is clearly direct support, some commentators
have argued that serving as a guard or lookout may entail direct support. Turner &
Norton, supra note 36, at 28. The Army FM notes that:
Civilian contractors may be employed to support Army operations and/or
weapon systems domestically or overseas. Contractors will generally be
assigned duties at echelons above division (EAD); EAD should be thought of
organizationally instead of a location on a map. However, if the senior
military commander deems it necessary, contractors may be temporarily
deployed anywhere as needed, consistent with the terms of the contract and
the tactical situation.
See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-39.
122. See Cathy Booth & Thomas Magnolia, Fear and Loathing on Iraqi Roads,
TIME, June 7, 2004, at 40 (describing the experience of former contractor John Shane
Ratliff).
Once while driving, [Ratliff] took a rock to the head, which knocked him
unconscious. His lone weapon was a can of ravioli his wife sent in a care
package. "[The Iraqis who attacked his truck] didn't know what [the can of
ravioli] was, something red shaped like that ... maybe they thought it was a
bomb."
Id. In a separate incident, another former contractor described how he beat one Iraqi
attacker to death with a hammer. Id.
123. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4.1.
124. See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7.
125. See 10 U.S.C § 1585 (1958) ("[Clivilian officers and employees of the
Department of Defense may carry firearms or other appropriate weapons while assigned
investigative duties or such other duties as the Secretary [of Defense] may prescribe.").
126. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 4.4.1.
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utilizing military specification ammunition. 127 A new draft DOD
Instruction provides that the Combatant Commander may
"authorize issuance of standard military side arms or
appropriate weapons to selected contractor personnel for
individual self-defense" 128 but only on those "rare occasions when
military force protection is deemed unavailable." 129 The June
2005 DEFARS states that the "Combatant Commander will
determine whether to authorize in-theater contractor
personnel
1 30
to carry weapons and what weapons will be allowed."
While a hostile environment and the limits of force
protection may favor the possession of weapons by civilian
contract personnel, other factors may weigh against it.1 3 ' First,
arming contractors may distort their battlefield status as
civilians accompanying the force. 132 Second, contractorsespecially those with prior military experience-may use the
weapon in an unauthorized manner, further blurring the line
between
combatant
and noncombatant. 133 Furthermore,
possession of a sidearm may cause the enemy to mistake a
contractor for a soldier, thereby having the unintended effect of
increasing the risk of physical harm to the contractor. 34 To
prevent accidents and misuse, contractors must be properly
trained 135 in use of firearms for self-defense
only and must
38
comply with all applicable local laws.
127. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-29; see also Bergner, supra note 16, at
29 ("A C.P.A. decree, which has now evolved into Iraqi law, limits the caliber and type of
weapons that private security personnel employ[, blut... heavy machine guns and
grenades are-perhaps by necessity-sometimes part of the arsenal.").
128. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DRAFT WORKING PAPER INST. No. 4XXX.bb, MANAGEMENT
OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS para. 6.3.5.1 (2004)
[hereinafter DOD DRAFT INST. No. 4XXX.bb].
129. Id.
130. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(j).
131. See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7.
132. Id.
133. See id. (stating that "[slince contractor personnel are not subject to command
authority enforced by an internal system of penal discipline, commanders have no
method of guaranteeing armed contractor personnel will act in accordance with the law
of war or HN [Host Nation] law").
134. Id.
135. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.5.3.4.
136. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-29.
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Even if the contractor gains approval from the Combatant
Commander to carry a sidearm in theater, the terms of the
contract or parent-company policy may forbid it.137 In reality,
contractors who wish to possess a firearm for self-defense must
not only gain approval of the Combatant Commander but must
also be authorized (or not expressly forbidden)
- ",138 by the terms of
the contract under which they are employed.
In the majority of
cases, civilian contractors may be provided with protective
clothing such as bulletproof vests 139 and helmets, 140 but few are
ever allowed to carry firearms. 14' Additionally, in some
circumstances, host-nation law may also prohibit contractors
142
from possessing firearms.
The exception, of course, would be
those civilian contractors who are specifically hired to provide
armed security protection to other civilians. 143 Depending on the
agreement with the host nation, in times of noninternational
armed conflict, these
144 individuals may be armed with firearms
pistols.
than
other

137. Id.; see also DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(i) (stating that "[sleveral
respondents want the rule to clarify that acceptance of weapons by contractor employees
is strictly voluntary and must be explicitly authorized by the contractor").
138. See FM 100-21, supranote 43, para. 6-29.
The bayonet was the only weapon I was allowed to carry. I took it out of the
bug-out bag every night and placed it on the table next to my bed for quick
use in case militants broke into the camp ....
Since all KBR [Kellogg, Brown & Root] employees are required to wear
protective gear when they're outside the camp, the next thing I reached for
was a flak vest. When not in use, it remained next to my military-style
Kevlar helmet ....
THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 28.
139. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.6.
140. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(i).
141. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 28. Civilian contractor Thomas
Hamill describes how on April 9, 2004, a terrorist attack on his truck convoy killed five
unarmed civilian contractor drivers and left two other civilians unaccounted for. Id. at
36, 46.
142. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 57.
143. See Taylor, supra note 54 (quoting Addicott that "large number[s] of security
personnel [are] hired to provide security for civilian contractors building bridges, roads
and providing transportation").
144. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(j)(2) (requiring the parent
contracting company to ensure that its personnel are adequately trained in the weapon
they are authorized to carry).
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B. ProtectingContractors
Army doctrine clearly provides that civilian contractors
accompanying the force must be protected. "[T]he Army's policy
has become that when contractors are deployed in support of
Army operations/weapons systems, they [contractors] will be
provided force protection commensurate with that provided to
DAC 145 personnel." 146 Still, force protection measures necessary
to safeguard contract personnel will vary depending on the
147
circumstances, taking into account known and perceived risks.
This is a directly proportional relationship; a more direct threat
requires greater force protection to safeguard contractor
personnel.148 For instance, during military operations in Somalia
in 1993, the risks to contract personnel supporting DOD
operations in theater were acute-armed gangs hostile to the
American presence and the humanitarian mission presented a
serious threat to the safety of civilian contract personnel. 149 As a
result, some contract personnel required an armed military
escort at all times. Conversely, other military operations present
lower levels of threat. In the late 1990s, civilian contract
personnel traveled "nearly 1 million miles a month on the open
roads of Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary...150 for the most part
without the benefit of any force protection."
In the War on Terror, ample evidence demonstrates that
contractors, particularly those who have not received training on
the rudimentary aspects of battlefield risks and how to manage
them, are more likely the targets of kidnapping or other acts of
violence.152 Within the general class of contractors, it is apparent
that those without prior military experience or those who

145. DAC is an acronym for civilians who work for the Army: Department of the
Army Civilian. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS, http://www.fortsamhoustonmwr.com/
acs/acronyms-andabbreviations.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
146. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-3.
147. See Young, supra note 26.
148. Id. at 11-12.
149. Id. at 11.
150. Id.
151. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, at 6.2.7.9.
152. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that "[t]he commander must protect
his contractors-they can do little to protect themselves").
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operate without the benefit of weapons for self-defense are at
the greatest risk. Nevertheless, even if the contractor is former
military, "the currency of their conditioning,
both mental and
153
physical, must be taken into account."
Army policy regarding contractor force protection must be
juxtaposed more generally against Joint DOD doctrine, which
relates to all the military services. 54 Interestingly, Joint
Publication (JP) 4-0, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in 2000, provides that "[florce protection responsibility
for DOD contractor employees is a contractor responsibility,
unless valid contract terms place that responsibility with

another party .

,,155

Consistent with JP 4-0, DOD force

protection makes it clear that contractors are private American
citizens and, accordingly, "[t]he Commanders do not have the
same legal responsibility to provide security for [DOD]
contractors as that provided for military forces or direct-hire
employees."5 6 Thus, while commanders may feel a moral or
practical obligation to provide active and comprehensive force
protection, in the sphere of legality, "[c]ontractors working
within a U.S. military facility or in close proximity of U.S.
Forces shall receive incidentally the benefits of measures
undertaken to protect U.S. Forces.
The Draft DOD Instruction entitled Management of
Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations provides
that contractors shall "receive incidentally the benefits of
measures undertaken to protect U.S. forces.
,,58 However, the
draft also mandates a higher level of responsibility in certain
instances: "[C]ommanders shall provide force protection,
commensurate with the level of force protection provided to
military forces, when contractor personnel are integral to the
military forces and providing essential contractor services (e.g.,

153.
154.
155.
156.
PROGRAM
157.
158.

Id. at 4.
See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7.
Id.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 2000.12, DOD ANTITERRORISM (AT)
para. 4.6 (2003).
Id.
See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4.
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159

contractor logistics convoys)."
While the Combatant Commander will make the final
decision "to provide force protection to participating
16 ° the degree of force protection civilian contractors
contractors,"
receive can also be a contractual matter that is determined by
the contract itself.'6 ' Consequently, astute negotiations on the
part of civilian contractors seeking to provide services to DOD
operations in hostile environments could obligate military
personnel to provide increased levels of force protection. Yet,
even if a particular contract absolves the military of formal force
protection responsibilities, military policy maintains that
commanders
assume
some duty
to protect civilians
accompanying the force, 16 2 particularly those who are deemed to
be M-E personnel. The June 2005 DFARS simply acknowledges
that the military should at least provide training to those
contractors that are issued special equipment. "The deployment
center, or the Combatant Commander, shall issue OCIE
[organizational clothing and individual equipment] and shall
provide training, if necessary,
to ensure the safety and security
163
personnel."
of contractor
Obviously, commanders should "ensure that contractor
security provisions are incorporated" into the operational plans
(OPLANs) and operational orders (OPORDs) when determining
the size of theater security forces.6 Given the importance of
certain categories of contract personnel to certain missions, it is
likely that the commander will willingly assume the
responsibility of providing appropriate force protection
commensurate with risks and resources available.
Paradoxically, although the military requires force
protection for civilian contract personnel accompanying the
forces, it is an impossible task to perform. In turn, a lack of
precise (and often contradictory) guidance can certainly hamper
the ability of contractor companies to fulfill their obligations vis159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

DOD DRAFr INST. NO. 4XXX.bb, supra note 128, para.6.3.5.
FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-7.
See id., paras. 6-7, 6-9; DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.4.
See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-39.
DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-740(i)(3).
JP 4-0, supra note 73.
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A-vis providing viable AT training to their employees. In short,
to protect their employees from harm (and themselves from time
consuming and costly lawsuits), contracting companies must
assume high levels of force protection
and AT training that may
16
5
not be provided by the military.
Equally disadvantaged by the absence of a uniform
standard, military commanders must "work with requirements
that vary according to the services and the individual
contracts"1 66 between the military and the contractor. Indeed,
the confusing nature of the contractor force protection doctrine
has led "the combatant commanders... [to request] DOD-wide
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces to
establish a baseline [force protection policy] that applies to all
the services."167 Until uniform DOD guidance is fully developed
regarding force protection, the only alternative is to ensure that
proper and adequate AT training is provided by the parent
contracting company to help close the gap.

IV. AT TRAINING
Although AT training is clearly a central theme of force
protection in general, it is an area that requires special attention,
particularly since the parent contracting company has a much
largerrole to play in AT training.168
MG (Ret.) Alfred A. Valenzuela
The current reality of the War on Terror has merged
traditional force protection concerns with antiterrorism policies
and security initiatives. It is now DOD policy that "[DOD]
Components and the [DOD] Elements and Personnel shall be

165. See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn & Nelson D. Schwartz, With Violence Escalating in
Iraq, Tens of Thousands of U.S. Contractorsare Getting More Than They BargainedFor,
FORTUNE, May 3, 2004, at 33 (stating that "[g]iven the danger, little work is getting done
in Iraq ... [cionvoys are stalled, waiting for protection, and [contract] workers are trying
to keep a low profile").
166. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
167. Id. at 25-26.
168. Interview with Alfred A. Valenzuela, Major Gen. (Ret.), U.S. Army, formerly
Commander U.S. Army S.; Deputy Commanding Gen., U.S. S. Command (June 20, 2005)
(on file with Author).
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protected from terrorist acts through a high priority,
comprehensive AT program." 169 Again, military commanders
have the primary "responsibility and authority to enforce
appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of [DOD]
Elements and Personnel subject to their control and shall ensure
AT awareness and readiness of all [DOD] Elements and
Personnel... assigned or attached."17 ° Unfortunately, this
Directive does not define what constitutes "appropriate security
measures." 171 Instead, the matter is left to the discretion of the
commander on the ground, 172 who is in the best position to
understand the most salient
threats and the proper
173
methodologies to counter them.
DOD policy 174 provides that training-both in certain basic
legal issues and in techniques to manage personal security in
hostile environments-should always be a prerequisite to
deployment. 175 Preventing the need for the military to engage in
personnel recovery of captured civilians, military doctrine is
clear on the need to provide appropriate AT training:
Before entering a theater of operations or an area of
responsibility.., identified [DOD] civilian employees,
[DOD] contractors (under the terms of the contract),
and other designated personnel shall receive or already
have completed the training necessary to survive
isolation in a hostile environment, including captivity,
and to return home safely and with honor. 176
Consistent with military doctrine, it seems entirely logical
that all civilian contractors should be processed and trained
through a DOD training site. Unfortunately, while a Draft DOD
169. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.1.
170. Id. para. 4.2.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Terrorist threats, though broadly classifiable, vary widely according to time,
place, and circumstance. The real-time intelligence and threat reporting known to a
commander must dictate the amount and scope of AT force protection afforded to all
personnel under the commander's authority. Attempting to institutionalize "appropriate
security measures" simply cannot be distilled in a DOD-wide directive.
174. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.9.
175. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, paras. 4.2, 4.3.
176. Id. para. 4.2.
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Instruction understands this basic need, 177 it is not currently the
case. In reality, AT training is approached in an extremely
fragmented and ad hoc manner. Although the military may
provide AT training at Individual Deployment Sites (IDS) 178 or
Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers
(CRC) 79 this does not always happen. 80 In fact, the use of IDS or
CRC facilities by contract personnel is determined based upon
the terms of the contract between the contractor and DOD.' 81
Then again, if contract personnel do require IDS or CRC predeployment processing they may not get meaningful AT training
since the IDS/CRC is tasked with actions to "screen contractor
personnel records, conduct theater specific briefings 182 and
training, issue theater specific clothing and individual
equipment, verify that medical requirements.., for deployment
have been met, and arrange for transportation to the theater of
operations." 83 Moreover, CRC focus is on military unit training

177. See DOD INST. No. 3020.41, supra note,17, para. 6.2.7.
The [DOD] Components shall ensure these requirements are delineated in
contracts. At a minimum, contracts shall state the means by which the
Government will inform contractors of the requirements and procedures
applicable to a deployment. The [DOD] Components shall ensure use of one
of the formally designated group or individual joint or Military Department
deployment centers (e.g., Continental U.S. Replacement Center, Individual
Replacement Center, Federal Deployment Center, Unit Deployment Site) to
conduct deployment and redeployment processing for CDF .... The
following general procedures, waiver, administrative preparation, medical,
training, and equipping considerations are applicable during deployment
processing of CDF and for theater admission of contingency contractor
personnel, where indicated ....

Id.
178. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 58.
179. See generally FM 100-21, supra note 43, ch. 3.
180. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 715-16, CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM para. 3-1(b) (2000).
181. Id. para. 3-1(b).
182. Briefings might include classified threat and vulnerability information
relevant to the deployed location. In comparison to those contract personnel who do not
receive such briefings, contract personnel who receive CRC support will be better
positioned to understand the risks of, and the security precautions necessary for the
specific theater.
183. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 715-16, supra note 180, para. 3-1(c).
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versus training of individual survival skill sets.184
The fact "that [DOD] contracts have varying and sometimes
inconsistent language addressing deployment requirements"
creates a sloppy training model for contractors engaged in
contingency operations. 185 Sending contractors into harm's way
absent a basic understanding of the threat or of the basic
principles associated with terrorism law 186 places the contractors
and the military forces they support at great risk.8 7 Thus, while
military doctrine provides that "[c]ontractors arriving in
theater.., must receive appropriate processing," 8 specified AT
training is not a mandatory component of contractor predeployment. 89 Certainly, the rise of terrorism and the
challenges of providing support to the armed forces in urban
settings necessitate additional AT training for contractors in
these high-risk environments.' 90 Yet, commanders are only
required to offer "AT training to contractors under the terms
specified in the contract,"1 91 leaving many contract personnel illprepared and under-equipped to operate in locations plagued by
the threat of car bombs, suicide bombers, and ambushes.

184. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 600-81, INFORMATION
HANDBOOK FOR OPERATING CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) REPLACEMENT
CENTERS AND INDIVIDUAL DEPLOYMENT SITES (2001), available at http://www.army.mil/
usapa/epubs/pdf/p600.81.pdf (providing continental U.S. replacement centers and
individual deployment sites with a standardized checklist for planning, operating, and
executing CRC operations).
185. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 35-36.
186. Terrorism law is a phrase coined by the Author to apply to all the legal
aspects of terrorism. See ADDICOrr, supra note 2, at xviii. Bill Piatt, Dean at St. Mary's
University School of Law, terms terrorism law as an "emerging legal discipline critical to
understanding the complex balance between global security and civil justice." Id. at xiii
(internal quotations omitted).
187. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 35-36. For instance, in closing, the GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense "[dievelop and require the use of standardized
deployment language .... This language should address the need to deploy into and
around the theater, required training, entitlements, force protection, and other
deployment related issues." Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
188. JP 4-0, supranote 73, at V-4.
189. See 48 C.F.R. § 5124.74-9000 (2005).
190. Working and living in an environment threatened by terrorism requires
specialized training in personnel, physical, and operational security that is distinct from
and in addition to traditional pre-deployment training.
191. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.6.
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The 2003 DOD guidance on isolated personnel training for
civilian contractors does outline certain AT training
requirements for contractors accompanying the force, but the
level of training is not uniform-it varies based on the level of
threat determined by the Combatant Commander. 192 The
guidance designates three levels of training regarding specific
principals of resistance: Level A, if the perceived threat by
hostile forces is low; Level B, for a medium threat level; and
Level C, for a high threat level. 19 The mechanics of the training
is often accomplished through the use of videos 9 4 and is
designed to help the contractor survive capture and exploitation
by hostile forces. 195 The training is not representative of
comprehensive Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE)
training given to certain categories of military personnel.
Another glaring deficiency associated with AT training is
the lack of a Civilian Code of Conduct 96 for civilian contractors
who may be captured by hostile forces, including terrorists.' 97
Civilian contractors sorely need "guidelines to increase their
chance of survival in captivity, and to avoid potential criminal
sanctions upon repatriation.",98 For example, all Americans owe
an unconditional allegiance to the United States and that
allegiance is not cut off simply because of capture by hostile
forces. 199

192. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 2.2.
193. Id. para. 6.2.1.
194. Before deploying on invitational travel orders to Colombia in 2004, the Author
was required to view a series of videos provided by U.S. Southern Command (the
Combatant Command). The videos covered the risks of terrorism and crime and how to
avoid capture or exploitation.
195. Id.
196. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Charlotte M. Liegl-Paul, Civilian
Prisonersof War: A Proposed Citizen Code of Conduct, 182 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2004).
197. See DOD INST. No. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 5.6 (directing the
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to "develop Code of Conduct training
standards" that are similar to the military Code of Conduct for the armed forces).
198. Liegl-Paul, supra note 196, at 123-24.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Tomoya Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 826 (S.D. Cal.
1950); see also 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (forbidding U.S. citizens from intentionally
obtaining or delivering national security information to be used to harm the United
States.).
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DOD guidance regarding the provision of basic AT training
has not kept up with the volume of contractors pouring into Iraq
and other places around the globe. In effect, civilian contractor
companies operating under the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), 200 are left to provide their
own AT training. Unfortunately, in far too many cases the AT
training is sorely inadequate or is simply not done. 20 1 The case of
Thomas Hamill of Macon, Mississippi, is typical of how this
process plays out in the real world.20 2 In late 2003, Hamill was
hired by Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) to serve as a driver of
large tanker trucks in Iraq.0 3 Hamill's case is noteworthy
because he is one of the few civilian contractors to have ever
survived a terrorist kidnapping-he escaped from his terrorist
204
captors following a brutal ambush of his truck convoy.
His
escape in 2004 is all the more amazing because he received only
limited training from KBR in basic force protection related
solely to his driving duties. He had no training whatsoever from
the military in how to survive, evade, resist, or escape from the
terrorists.2 0 5 Escaping after twenty-four days in captivity,
military SERE experts who interviewed him after the ordeal
were impressed by Hamill's level-headed dealings with his
terrorist captors, stating: "We don't know how you did it. You
aren't a soldier, and you haven't been trained [in AT
techniques] .,206

200. ARMY REGULATION 700-37, LOGISTICS CIvIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
(LOGCAP) (1985).
201. See James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, For Right Price, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2004, at A9 (noting that "little regulation of the quality of training or recruitment
[of contractors] by private companies" exists, possibly resulting in "inexperienced, poorly
prepared and weakly led units playing vital roles in combat situations"). "Even elite
former commandos [employed by security contracting firms] may not be well trained for
every danger... ." Id.
202. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16. KBR is the engineering and
construction
group
at
Halliburton.
See
Halliburton,
Welcome
to KBR,
http://www.halliburton.conkbr/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (stating that KBR is
"a global engineering, construction, technology and services company").
203. THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16.
204. See generally THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 37-38, 244-45.
205. Id. at 258-59.
206. Id. at 259 (internal quotations omitted).
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Hamill was only slightly better prepared from the KBR
training than if he had received no AT training at all. When first
hired in 2003, Hamill was flown to KBR headquarters in
Houston, Texas, for "a seven-day orientation class."2 °7 A month
after the course, Hamill was flown to Kuwait where he was
given a second round of training courses. 208 "They had us attend
[a] defensive-driving course U where we discussed things such as
convoy formations, how to spot explosive devices, booby traps,
and how to recognize and avoid suspicious automobiles." 20 9 Then,
before each convoy was started on the road for its destination,
Hamill, now a convoy commander, would receive a safety
briefing from KBR as to road conditions and possible danger
from terrorist attacks. 2' ° Beyond this, Hamill never received any
other type of AT training.
In light of the Hamill experience, it is imperative that either
the military or the parent contracting company provide a higher
level of meaningful and realistic AT training that prepares DOD
contract personnel for high-risk deployments. 21' For the
contractor, adequate AT training provides "the first opportunity
to get the contractor's head in the current joint operational and
tactical situation"21 2 present within the theater. Obviously, the
preferred point of contact for this obligation should be the
military. As it becomes the "primer for theater specific force
protection and personnel recovery readiness of contractors en
route from [the continental United States] to high-threat
overseas venues," 21 3 the CRC has the potential to provide near
real-time information that will improve contractor safety and
survivability. Training also facilitates contractor compliance
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id. at 17.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 18-19. Hamilton wrote, "KBR started our mission with a meeting to
issue safety and task instructions. The convoy commander discussed hazard
identification and talked about dangers we might encounter." Id. at 18.
211. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at F-6 (describing that the U.S. Army CONUS
CRC at Fort Benning, Georgia "could serve as a joint and interagency CRC to potentially
enhance the accountability, survivability, and recoverability of a major segment of
overseas personnel, including USG contractors").
212. Id. at F-10.
213. Id. at F-11.
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with and understanding of security-related DOD regulations,
such as those regarding temporary duty travel abroad, 14 made
applicable to contract personnel through the DOD AT Program
Directive.215
If the military does not provide the proper AT training,
parent contracting companies need to hire specialists to provide
in-house training to ensure that their employees are as ready as
possible to handle the exigencies associated with contingency
operations and possible capture by hostiles. Not only is there a
moral duty to see that this is accomplished, but the parent
company that fails in this regard may be subjecting itself to
possible civil liability. Just as contracting companies must
ensure that employees have proper equipment, clothing, and
supplies to perform the contract, they are also responsible to
provide AT awareness training to their employees similar to
that provided to military personnel.
In short, contractors who receive AT and security-related
training prior to deployment are better positioned to avoid and
manage the risks encountered on MOOTW or armed conflict.216
This, in turn, takes pressure off the commander in terms of force
protection concerns and the conservation of military resources.

214. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 4500.54, OFFICIAL TEMPORARY DUTY
TRAVEL ABROAD para. 3 (1991).
It is [DOD] policy that the number of visits and visitors to overseas areas shall be
minimal, and be made only when their purpose cannot be satisfied by other means.
Visits shall be arranged with a minimum requirement on equipment, facilities, time and
services of installations, and personnel being visited. When practicable, trips to the same
general area and in the same general period shall be consolidated.

Id.
215. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.5
(requiring that "[all [DOD] military, [DOD] civilians, [DOD] dependent family members,
and [DOD] contractors shall comply with theater, country, and special clearance
requirements").
216. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-50-323, MAJ. THOMAS W. MURREY, JR.,
KHOBAR TOWERS' PROGENY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION (1999).
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V.

PARENT CONTRACTOR COMPANY LIABILITY ISSUES
REGARDING EMPLOYEES ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

The [civilian contractor] industry falls through the cracks at the
nationaland internationallevel .... Private military contractors
exist in the same legal vacuum as detainees
at GuantanamoBay.
2 17
Peter Singer, Brookings Institution
With the increasing number of terrorist-related deaths and
woundings of civilian contractors accompanying the military in
the War on Terror, the question of civil liability for contracting
companies has become an important concern. Considering the
rapid rate at which individual employee contractors are
prepared, processed, and trained to go into dangerous
environments-such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia-it is
inevitable that civil litigation against parent contract companies
will arise. A 2004 civil lawsuit filed in Wake County Superior
Court, Raleigh, North Carolina, against the contracting
company Blackwater Security Consulting and other named
defendants, illustrates the concern.2 18
Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting1 9 was filed by the
survivors of four deceased independent civilian contractors and
is the first in the nation to be lodged against a private military
contracting company for death during a MOOTW mission.220 The
four contractors were hired as security consulting contractors
and were viciously murdered on March 31, 2004, while escorting
a civilian convoy through
Iraq, a known hostile
•
221 Fallujah,
environment at the time.
Among a list of allegations of
217. Neff& Price, supra note 48.
218. See id. (discussing the suit brought by the families of four contractors who
were ambushed and killed in Fallujah in March 2004); Complaint at 1, Nordan v.
Blackwater Security Consulting (N.C. Super. Ct. 2005) [hereinafter Nordan Complaint].
"The lawsuit, filed in Wake County Superior Court, is the first in the nation to be filed
against a private military contractor for death on the battlefield, according to military,
legal and industry experts." Neff & Price, supra note 48.
219. Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 1, 32.
220. See Neff & Price, supra note 48.
221. See id.; Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 4; see also Bergner, supra note
16, at 33 (detailing the brutal murders of the security contractors who, in the process of
accompanying a kitchen-supply truck to a nearby base, were attacked by insurgents). "At

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 28:2

wrongdoing, the families contend that Blackwater sent the
contractors into this hostile environment without proper
equipment or armed escorts as promised in the contract.22 2 The
families also alleged that the amount of AT training given to the
deceased contractors was insufficient.2 23 The formal allegations
lodged by the survivors consist of fraud in the inducement of the
contract and wrongful death as the contractors had been
promised protection and proper information (associated with AT
224
training) when they signed the contracts.
A new development in the Nordan case appeared in the
summer of 2005, when a federal judge sent the suit back to state
court. Not long after the case was first filed in January 2005,
Blackwater filed a motion to have the case heard in federal
court.225 Blackwater's rationale for having the case heard in
federal court was twofold: First, it argued that the Defense Base
Act,22 6 a federal law capping death benefits for contractors
working outside of the United States, entirely preempted state
law relevant to this matter.2 27 Second, Blackwater asserted that
the question of remedies available to contractors in war zones
was an issue of "unique federal interest."228 U.S. District Judge
Louise W. Flanagan, while conceding that the case dealt with
"novel and complex" issues, rejected Blackwater's arguments
and ruled that the case was appropriate for the North Carolina
court. 229 This decision was widely interpreted as a victory for the
the time, the Fallujah killings seemed notable not only for their brutality but also for the
fact that private security men had been the victims." Bergner, supra note 16, at 33-34.
222. See Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 5-6, 25-26.
223. See id. at 9, 12, 14, 17, 21.
224. See id. at 21-30.
225. Emery P. Dalesio, Blackwater Suit Sent to State: Wrongful Death Case to Be
Heard in N.C. Court, FederalJudge Says, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 2005.
226. See infra note 250.
227. See Dalesio, supra note 225; see also Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651
(2004).
228. See Dalesio, supra note 225.
229. Id. The court ordered that Blackwater's contention "that this case is
removable by virtue of complete preemption under the DBA is without merit." Press
Release, Callahan & Blaine Attorneys at Law, Federal Court Rules in Favor of the
Families of American Security Contractors Executed in Iraq (Aug. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.callahan-law.com (follow "news & articles" hyperlink: then follow: "Federal
Court Rules in Favor of the American Security Contractors Executed in Iraq" hyperlink)
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plaintiffs, due to the fact that North Carolina permits pecuniary
compensation in wrongful death suits. 230 The decision could also
be taken as a victory for legal observers interested in clearing up
some of the muddier legal questions surrounding the rights and
obligations of overseas civilian contractors and their employers.
Before detailing the Nordan lawsuit, it is important to
consider some of the possible reasons that many civilian
contractors might be motivated to sign on to work for companies
overseas, particularly in dangerous environments. Apart from
fulfilling a sense of patriotism to the nation at war, in all
probability a significant incentive rests in the increased pay that
the civilian contractor can receive. 231 Not only do most
companies pay danger premiums for work in hostile
environments, but much of the pay earned overseas may be tax
deductible.23 2 For example, the U.S. Army allows contracting
officers to negotiate increased amounts of pay when the
employee operates in areas considered to be equivalent to a war233
type environment. For many civilians the increase in pay is a
(internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter Callahan & Blaine].
230. Dalesio, supra note 225; see also Callahan & Blaine, supra note 229 (quoting
Daniel J. Callahan, chief counsel to the plaintiffs, who claimed that the federal "court
clearly found that the jurisdiction of this case rests with the state court, which paves the
way for the court to hold Blackwater liable for its wrongful conduct, establish guidelines
and accountability for the treatment of security contractors in Iraq, and send a message
to other security contracting firms operating abroad.").
231. Hamill was paid "$16 to $18 per hour for a yearlong contract that would be
worth about $75,000, all of which would be tax-free as long as [he] remained in Iraq for
the full term of [the] contract." THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16; see also
Bergner, supra note 16, at 34 (reporting that Americans, on average, make between $400
and $700 a day in Iraq, and sometimes more, depending on the amount of time they
spend back in the United States, and most of this income is tax-free); Neff & Price, supra
note 48 (noting that each of the contractors killed in Fallujah were induced by the offer
of $600 per day for their labor and expertise); Bill Hendrick, World's Most Dangerous
Job; Iraq Duty Pays Well, and HalliburtonRecruiters Find Many Ready to Roll the Dice,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 17, 2004, at 1A (describing Kellogg, Brown, & Root's generous
pay and benefits that "prove[s] a siren call to many applicants, some of whom have been
unemployed for years").
232. Hendrick, supra note 231, at 1A (noting that many workers are willing to
brave the extreme elements and dangers of Iraq in order to earn up to $300,000 yearly).
"The first $80,000 is tax-free after 330 days 'in country.'" Id.
233. See U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Guidance for Deployed Department
of Army Emergency-Essential (E-E) Circular Employees and Supervisors (2005),
http://www.arcent.army.mil/civempguide/index.asp#section III; Sandra Maday, A City
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sufficient inducement to subject themselves to a hostile, even
deadly work environment.
On the other hand, many companies seek to insulate
themselves from any liability whatsoever by crafting language
in the contract that leaves the contractor (or his heirs) with
virtually no ability to sue the parent company. Again, the
Nordan case is quite telling concerning the methodology of how
the contractor company attempts to absolve itself of liability. A
typical Blackwater contract related to employment duties in
Iraq or Afghanistan contains a clause regarding contract
performance during hostilities:
Contractor agrees and acknowledges that the Services
performed in the Duty Station... have been identified
as being essential to BSC's [Blackwater] complete
performance under the terms of the contract between
BSC and the Customer [the United States] and
notwithstanding the existence of hostilities or a state of
war, whether declared or undeclared, Contractor agrees
to perform his or her assigned duties until released
from such duties by the Contractor's supervisor or the
supervisor's designated representative.234
Next, the sample Blackwater contract has a clause
headlined as "Contractor Acknowledgement, Release and
Waiver." 235 Spelling out an assumption of the risk, the clause

graphically reads:
Contractor agrees and acknowledges that due to the
hazardous nature of the Duty Station and the Services
to be provided hereunder, Contractor hereby expressly
and voluntarily agrees to assume any and all risks of
personal injury including, without limitation, death and
disability which may result from contractor providing
Services pursuant to this Agreement. Contractor
understands and acknowledges that the Duty Station
[place where the contractor works] is volatile, hostile
and extremely dangerous and in some instances,
that Lives for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A25.
234. Blackwater Security Consulting IC Contract, para. 10 [hereinafter Blackwater
Contract] (on file with Author), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/private
warriors/PW_20041023_blackwater2.pdf. (last visted Feb. 5, 2006).
235. Id. para. 11.
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military forces may be conducting
continuing military
36
operations in the region.
The assumption of the risk clause then continues with a
lengthy list of the dangers and risks that the Contractor
acknowledges and "voluntarily, expressly and irrevocably
assum[es] .
Contractor understands and acknowledges that by
voluntarily agreeing to participate in the Engagement
[accompanying the military on a contingency operation
or actual armed conflict], he is voluntarily, expressly
and irrevocably assuming any and all known and
unknown, anticipated and unanticipated risks which
could result in physical or emotional injury, paralysis,
death, or damage to himself, to his property, or to third
parties, whether or not such injury or death is caused
by other independent contractors to BSC, known and
unknown domestic and foreign3 citizens or terrorist or
U.S. governmental employees.2 8
In addition to the above exculpatory clauses, Blackwater
further attempts to release liability for any acts of negligence on
its part by239including the following language in a clause entitled
"Release:"
Contractor, on behalf of Contractor and Contractor's
spouse, heirs,
administrators,
estate, personal
representatives, successors and assigns (collectively
referred to as "Contractor's Group"), hereby releases
and forever discharges BSC ...(collectively referred to

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The clause then continues with a list of the risks:
The risks include, among other things and without limitation, the
undersigned being shot, permanently maimed and/or killed by a firearm or
munitions, falling aircraft or helicopters, sniper fire, landmine, artillery fire,
rocket propelled grenade, truck or car bomb, earthquake or other natural
disaster, poisoning, civil uprising, terrorist activity, hand to hand combat,
disease, poisoning, [poisoning is listed twice], etc., killed or maimed while a
passenger in a helicopter or fixed wing aircraft, suffering hearing loss, eye
injury or loss; inhalation or contact with biological or chemical contaminants
(whether airborne or not) and or flying debris, etc.
Id.
239. Id. para. 11.2.
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as "Releasees") from any and all claims, judgments,
awards, actions and causes of action which may be
asserted now or in the future by Contractor's Group for
any liability whatsoever for accident, injury (including
without limitation, death or disability), losses, loss of
consortium, expenses, loss of income and other damages
based upon or in any way arising from Contractor's
performance of Services pursuant to this Agreement
and the transportation of Contractor, including, without
limitation, loss of life.., whether as a result of
negligence, gross negligence, omissions or failure to
guard or warn against dangerous conditions, use,
structure or activity, or any other cause, arising from
Contractor's participation in the Engagement... even
if such injury was caused in whole or in part by the
negligence of Releases.24 °
To further reinforce the position that the company cannot be
sued in civil court, the contract specifically spells out the
following
in a separate paragraph entitled "Covenant Not to
,24 1
,

Sue:

Contractor further agrees and covenants not to file,
prosecute, bring, maintain or in any way proceed on any
claim, suit, civil action, complaint, arbitration or
administrative action or proceeding of any kind in any
municipal, state, federal agency, court, or tribunal
against Releasees with respect [sic] any of the foregoing
facts, occurrences, events, transactions, damages,
injuries, claims, causes of action and other matters
released in Section 11.2 [the "Release" clause set out
above] .22
Then, in a separate clause entitled, "Liquidated Damages,"243
the Blackwater contract expressly sets out:
The parties hereto expressly agree that in the event of
Contractor's death or injury based upon or in any way
arising from Contractor's performance of Services
pursuant to this Agreement and the transportation of

240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. para. 11.3.
Id.
Id. para. 11.4.
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Contractor, even if such injury was caused in whole or
in part by the negligence of Releasees, Contractor's
Group has no recourse whatsoever against BSC.
Contractor understands and agrees that if he is hurt or
killed during Contractor's performance of Services
pursuant to this Agreement or the transportation of
has no recourse whatsoever
Contractor, Contractor
244
against Releasees.
Finally, at the end of the lengthy contract, the contractor
employee agrees to a final waiver:
By signing this document, Contractor acknowledges
that if Contractor is hurt or his property is damaged
while providing Services hereunder, the intent is that
Contractor and Contractor's Group is bound by this
Release and Indemnification and therefore will be found
by a court of law to have waived his right to maintain a
lawsuit against BSC on the basis of any claim from
which Contractor has released them herein.
Obviously, an employment contract such as the detailed
Blackwater example serves as a formidable shield to any legal
responsibility on the part of the parent company. Because many
contracts are interpreted within the "four corners" of the
contract, these iron clad provisions are generally viewed as
binding, leaving contract personnel with little recourse against
the company if he or she is harmed or killed.2 6b Likewise, there
appears to be little incentive for the company to take
responsibility for its contractors as the contract language
24
precludes the contractor from suing, even for the company's
248
negligent behavior.
244. Id.
245. Id. para. 20.16.
246. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:5 (4th ed. 2005).
247. Blackwater Contract, supra note 234, para. 20. The Blackwater contract does
contain a paragraph that the agreement "shall be governed by... the law[] of the State
of North Carolina, applicable to contracts made and to be fully performed therein,
excluding its conflict of laws principles." Id.
248. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 170 (5th ed. 1984) (describing negligence as "conduct which falls below a standard
established by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.
The idea of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger, based upon
some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly
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In response to the plaintiffs in Nordan, Blackwater can raise
the following defenses: the contract specifically spelled out the
dangers; the workers signed a release giving up most of their
rights to sue Blackwater if something untoward happened to
them; their families and their estates cannot sue either, even if
the deaths were the result of Blackwater's negligence or gross
negligence; and the contractors signed on willingly, were being
paid a large sum of money, and were fully aware of all of the
risks since all of them were military veterans. 249 Furthermore,
Blackwater will argue that the Defense Base Act 250 is the
contractor's remedy, particularly if the dependents of the
contractors have already started to receive payments for the
deaths of the contractors. However, if the court finds that the
decedents were not employees, but rather independent
contractors, then the applicability of the statute is brought into
question. The test to determine whether the decedents were
independent contractors will center on a number of factors to
include: (1) the extent of control exercised over the work by the
employer; (2) the presence of independent skills, knowledge, and
training of the decedents; (3) the method of payment and taxes;
(4) the •length
of time of employment; and (5) the provision of
251
equipment.
Indeed, if the court finds that the relationship
between the decedents and Blackwater was not that of
employee/employer, then the Act will not bar recovery by the
plaintiffs.2 2

follow.").
249. See Neff & Price, supra note 48 (noting that all of the contractors were
military veterans and likely knew of the inherent risks of working in Iraq; and if they
weren't aware of those risks, the unequivocal language in the contract would get their
attention).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). Better known as the Defense Base Act, this
legislation extends provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act to personal injuries and deaths suffered by employees of military
bases overseas. Id. §§ 1651(a)(1)-(2), (6). In effect, the Act "established workers'
compensation insurance for the employees of overseas government contractors." Neff &
Price, supra note 48. One spokesman has already alluded to the possibility that
Blackwater would use the Defense Base Act to bar the plaintiffs from collecting any
damages from the company. Id. (arguing that "[t]he dependents.., have begun receiving
lifetime payments of $1,100 per week tax-free").
251. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 5 (2005).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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Aside from the relying on the contract provisions
themselves, the parent contracting companies can also rely on a
"Government Contract Defense" to further absolve themselves of
responsibility. First raised in the context of a contractor's
liability for a manufacturing defect, this defense is set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies.5 3
Boyle arose in the context of a tort claim asserting that a defense
contractor had negligently designed a helicopter escape hatch
resulting in the death of the pilot when the helicopter crashed.25 4
The Court applied a three-prong test to determine whether the
contractor was immune from suit. The Court concluded that the
Government Contract Defense was applicable where: (1) the
contractor has taken actions at the direction of agency officials
exercising their discretionary authority; (2) the directions
involved reasonably precise specifications created by the
Government with which the contractor complied; and (3) the
contractor did not fail to warn the Government of known
dangers associated with the Government's design. 255 The
contractor was immunized from tort liability for damages
arising from the alleged helicopter design defects.2 6
Currently, the immunity arising under Boyle is a potentially
valuable tool for those contract companies that provide a
weapons system in a battlefield environment. Providing such
equipment in a combat or contingency operation raises the
stakes for all parties involved. This is true because the failure of
a weapons system can have direct adverse consequences in
25
terms of property damage and combat casualties. 25 Such
adverse consequences could then give rise
to potentially
25
enormous financial liability to the contractor. 8

253. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
254. See id. at 502-03.
255. See id. at 512-14.
256. See id. at 512.
257. See generally id. at 511-13; see also Threats and Responses, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2003, at A14.
258. See generally Malesko v. Correctional Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d. Cir.
2000); Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1993); Guillory v. Ree's
Countract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 346 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966-67 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
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While this scenario no doubt makes reliance on the Boyle
defense a potentially important shield for contractors, it is
important to note that Boyle involved a contract for production
of a weapons system.5 9 Currently, many overseas contractor
efforts in support of contingency operations usually involve
contracts for services. At least two federal district courts have
undertaken detailed analyses of this issue, and both have held
that the rationale for the defense outlined in Boyle and its
progeny dictates that the defense is also available to civilian
contractors
performing
service
contracts,
not
just
manufacturing.2 6 °
Another possible line of defense for a contracting company is
the so-called "Government Agency Defense." 261 This defense
basically holds that if a contractor engages in a valid legal
activity in furtherance of the performance of a government
contract he is immune from suit for that activity to the extent
that the government would be immune if sued directly. 262 The
treatment of this defense by federal courts in recent decades has
been woefully inconsistent and, therefore, unfortunately
provides little real guidance.2 63
Despite the rigid language of Blackwater-styled contracts
and the above-mentioned defenses, plaintiffs (like those in

259. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
260. See Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 854 F. Supp.
400, 422-23 (D.S.C. 1994); Askir v. Brown & Root Serv. Corp., No. 95-11008, 1997 WL
598587, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1997).
261. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940) (establishing
the government agency defense); see also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d
736, 739 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that under the government agency defense, the
agent's actions are imputed to the government, so "the contractor could be deemed to
share in federal sovereign immunity").
262. See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21 ("Where an agent or officer of the Government
purporting to act on its behalf has been held to be liable for his conduct causing injury to
another, the ground of liability has been found to be either that he exceeded his
authority or that it was not validly conferred.").
263. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 (noting that the government contractor "defense is
rarely invoked, and its elements are nowhere clearly stated"); see also RichlandLexington, 854 F. Supp. at 421 n.14 (explaining that the government agency defense is
actually a distinct subset of the more general government contractor defense; while
rarely used, the government agency defense has been mislabeled and misapplied in other
cases).
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Nordan) may still be able to recover significant monetary
damages even if they entered into an "iron-clad" contract. First,
the claims will be filed in individual State courts and therefore
the applicable State law may provide some relief, for example,
under a wrongful death statute that allows for financial
compensation or an expansive strict liability theory. Apart from
the fact that the parent company may be held liable for
intentional or reckless conduct, strict liability may prove to be a
viable option.
The Second Restatement of Torts established strict liability
for defendants who engage in ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous activities.264 Clearly, sending contractors into hostile
combat zones would be considered an abnormally dangerous
activity. Section 519 of the Restatement generally declares that
"[olne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm."26 5 Naturally, this section
also limits the liability "to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous."26 6

264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1977).
265. Id. § 519(1). The Restatement does not explicitly define what qualifies as an
abnormally dangerous activity, but the Reporters' Note lists a number of specific
instances where courts have found the defendant to be engaged in an abnormally
dangerous activity. Id. Such activities include, but are not limited to: (1) the collection of
water in quantity in an inappropriate or dangerous location; (2) the use of explosives in
an unsafe area; (3) the use of inflammable liquids or blasting in the middle of an urban
area; (4) pile driving; (5) the escape of poisonous chemicals into the air; (6) the drilling of
oil wells or the operation of refineries in highly populated areas; and (7) nuclear energy
production. Id.
266. Id. § 519(2). To clarify, the comment for this subsection states that "[tihe rule
of strict liability ... applies only to harm that is within the scope of the abnormal risk
that is the basis of the liability." Id. § 519 cmt. e; see, e.g., Madsen v. East Jordan
Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d 794, 795 (Utah 1942) (finding strict liability inapplicable where
the defendant's nearby blasting operation disturbed a farmer's minks, who reacted by
killing their offspring). In Madsen, the court found that strict liability was inappropriate,
because the resulting harm was unforeseeable. Id. at 795-96; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1977) (explaining that a defendant engaged in an
abnormally dangerous activity is not liable if the harm would not have occurred but for
the abnormally sensitive nature of the plaintiffs activity); see generally George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-56 (1972)
(juxtaposing the defendant's imposition of an unreasonable risk of harm on plaintiffs
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The subjective factors for determining whether or not an
activity is abnormally dangerous are set out in § 520 of the
Restatement. 267 These factors include: (1) the "existence of a high
degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;" 26s (2) the "likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great;" 269 (3) the "inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; '270 (4) the "extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage;" 271 (5) the
"inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on;
and (6) the "extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes."2 73
with the reciprocal plaintiffs imposition of an unreasonable risk of liability on the
defendant).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
268. Id. § 520(a). "In determining whether there is... a major risk, it may
therefore be necessary to take into account the place where the activity is
conducted...." Id. § 520 cmt. g.
269. Id. § 520(b). "The harm threatened must be major in degree, and sufficiently
serious in its possible consequences to justify holding the defendant strictly responsible
for subjecting others to an unusual risk." Id. § 520 cmt. g.
270. Id. § 520(c). "Most ordinary activities can be made entirely safe by the taking
of all reasonable precautions; and when safety cannot be attained by the exercise of due
care there is reason to regard the danger as an abnormal one." Id. §520 cmt. h. "The
utility of [the defendant's] conduct may be such that he is socially justified in proceeding
with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it
be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers
harm as a result of it." Id.
271. Id. § 520(d). Comment i of this section explains:
An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. It does not
cease to be so because it is carried on for a purpose peculiar to the individual
who engages in it. Certain activities, notwithstanding their recognizable
danger, are so generally carried on as to be regarded as customary.
Id. § 520 cmt. i. Stated generally, if the hazardous activity is rare and is not engaged in
by the general public, it is more likely to be tagged as abnormally dangerous. Id.
272. Id. § 520(e). "In other words, the fact that the activity is inappropriate to the
place where it is carried on is a factor of importance in determining whether the danger
is an abnormal one." Id. at § 520 cmt. j.
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1977). "Even though the activity
involves a serious risk of harm that cannot be eliminated with reasonable care and it is
not a matter of common usage, its value to the community may be such that the danger
will not be regarded as an abnormal one." Id. § 520 cmt. k. Generally, the activity will
not be considered abnormally dangerous "when the community is largely devoted to the
dangerous enterprise and its prosperity largely depends on it." Id.
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In assessing each of the factors listed in § 520, it should be
noted that none of them are dispositive, and it is not necessary
to prove each of them in order to find that an activity qualifies
as abnormally dangerous.2 74 Moreover, none of the factors have
to be given equal weight.275 In short, the framers of the
Restatement grant courts wide latitude in using these factors to
determine the dangerousness of the activity. 2766 Section 522 takes
things a step further, imposing strict liability on a defendant
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity "for the resulting
harm although it is caused by the unexpectable [1] innocent,
negligent, or reckless conduct of a third person, or [2] action of
an animal, or [3] operation of a force of nature."27 7
Applying all of these factors to the plaintiffs' claims in
Nordan, it appears on the surface that a solid case for strict
liability can certainly be made against the defendants. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the defendant's

274. See id. § 520 cmt. f. This comment further elaborates:
In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors.., are all to be
considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily
sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be
required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each
of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.
Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. Comment f sums up the appropriate way for courts to assess these
factors:
Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to reduce
abnormally dangerous activities to any definition. The essential question is
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or
because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of
strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on
with all reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and
inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness it
may have for the community, it should be required as a matter of law to pay
for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence.
Id.
277. Id. § 522 (1977). The drafters explain their rationale behind this section,
noting that "those who carry on abnormally dangerous activities... have for their own
purposes created a risk that is not a usual incident of the ordinary life of the
community." Id. § 522 cmt. a. "If the risk ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the
harm occurs through the unexpectable action of a human being, an animal or a force of
nature." Id.
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business does not qualify as an abnormally dangerous activity.
The representations made to the plaintiffs when they signed on
with Blackwater to serve as security contractors certainly sent a
message that their job would include specific hazards that
required special equipment and training (to include AT
training).2 7 8 It also appears that most of the six factors listed in
§ 520 can be applied to the facts of the Nordan case. The first
four factors are particularly applicable, as it is obvious that the
situation the security contractors faced in Fallujah constituted
"a high degree of risk of some harm... [to] others,"2 79 with the
likelihood that the resulting harm "will be great"280 and could
care." 281
not be eliminated with "the exercise of reasonable
Moreover, it will be difficult for the defendants to demonstrate
that the activity they hired the contractors to engage in was "a
matter of common usage. 28 2
Nevertheless, the last two factors are more problematic for
the plaintiff. It is less likely that a court will find the
defendants' activities in Fallujah to be inappropriate for that

278. See Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, para. 13 (stating various protections,
tools, and information that Blackwater claimed the security contractors would be
supplied within performing their job in Iraq). These resources that were promised by
Blackwater included: (1) assurances that no security mission would be staffed with less
than six team members; (2) guarantees that all missions would be conducted in armored
vehicles; (3) promises that each security team would be equipped with no less than two
armored vehicles, with three or more security contractors in each vehicle; (4) assurances
that the tail gunner on each armored vehicle would have a heavy automatic weapon
capable of firing up to 850 rounds per minute; (5) a pledge that security contractors
would receive at least twenty-four hours notice before any mission; (6) promises that risk
assessment reviews would be completed before the contractors embarked on any mission
(including a caveat that if the threat level for any mission was too high, the contractors
would have the option of not performing); (7) allowances for the contractors to review
travel plans, gather intelligence and perform inspections of the route and general
logistics prior to any mission; and (8) assurances that the security contractors would be
given three weeks to acclimate themselves to the locale and determine the lay of the land
and possible safe routes. Id. Although many of the promises made by Blackwater went
unfulfilled, the amount and breadth of the arrangements would suggest to a reasonable
contractor that this job would be unusually difficult and hazardous. Id.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (1977).
280. Id. § 520(b).
281. Id. § 520(c).
282. Id. § 520(d).
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locale. 2 3 Fallujah was a well-known hostile zone where
terrorists regularly operated.284 Additionally, the court could
subjectively find that the valuable service that the defendants
supplied to the Iraqi civilian population and American troops in
the Fallujah community
outweighed the dangerous attributes of
285
the activity itself.
At the end of the day, of course, the Restatement grants the
court the power to exercise a great amount of discretion in
assessing these criteria. Accordingly, the formula the court
would use to assign weight and persuasiveness to each of the
factors makes prognostication nearly impossible. Still, § 519 of
the Restatement reveals that a defendant can exercise the
utmost care and still be liable for the harm that another suffers
2 6
as a result of the defendant's abnormally dangerous activity. 8
As such, the precautions taken and the equipment supplied by
Blackwater cannot shield them from strict liability for the
harms that befell the plaintiffs in Fallujah on March 31, 2004. A
fortiori, if the plaintiff can show that Blackwater was actually
deficient in providing the proper equipment or AT training, the
strict liability case becomes stronger.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that other factors
make the imposition of strict liability on the defendants, based
on their engagement in an abnormally dangerous activity, much
more difficult. Most significantly, § 523 of the Restatement
makes a "plaintiffs assumption of the risk of harm from an
abnormally dangerous activity" an absolute bar from recovery.287

283. Id. § 520(e).
284. See Sandra Mackey, A City That Lives for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004,
at A25 (noting Fallujah's connection to the tribes of central Iraq and their longtime
resistance to any outside authority, whether Baathist or American). Fallujah was
ultimately cleared of the terrorists in late 2004 by American and Iraq forces.
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1997).
286. Id. § 519.
287. Id. § 523. "[The ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff in failing to
discover an abnormally dangerous activity or to take precautions against it is not a
defense to the strict liability of the actor who carries it on, [but] the plaintiffs voluntary
acceptance of the abnormal risk is a defense." Id. § 523 cmt. b. However, the plaintiff
does not assume risk without knowledge of its existence. Id. § 523 cmt. c. "The risk
inseparable from the great majority of abnormally dangerous activities is ... a matter of
such common knowledge and general notoriety that in the absence of special
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The defendants are likely to argue the plaintiff was aware of all
of the dangers associated with the job and still signed an
employment contract that specifically informed them of the
risks, which they assumed. ss If the court finds this argument to
be credible, it could prove fatal to the plaintiffs' claims of strict
liability based on the exercise of an abnormally dangerous
activity. Nevertheless, many courts view assumption of the risk
language to be calculated risks that do not automatically bind
contractor-employees, particularly when viewed in the light of
289
any promises made by the parent contracting company.
Faced with the assumption of the risk obstacle, which is
included as boilerplate contract language for all of the
contracting companies, the plaintiffs could still use some of the
strict liability elements to buttress their negligence claims.2 90 As
counterintuitive as it might appear, in arguing for imposition of
strict liability, plaintiffs could cite the amount of increased
training they were required to undertake as evidence of the
abnormal and hazardous nature of the activity. As more often is

circumstances.., a plaintiff may often be found to have the knowledge notwithstanding
his own denial." Id.
288. Without looking at the employment contract signed by the plaintiffs, it is
difficult to accurately speculate whether the assumption of risk defense will be
successful. However, it will even more difficult for the plaintiffs to argue that they were
not aware of the risk inherent with their jobs, even before they left for Iraq. After all,
media coverage of the second Gulf War has consistently emphasized the everyday perils
faced by coalition troops and contractors in Iraq. See Kirk Semple, Deployed: Dangerous
Patrol; New York Nerve, Tested on Meanest Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at B1
(detailing the dangers faced and fears overcome by New York City's "Fighting 69th"
battalion, part of the National Guard's 42nd Infantry Division); see also Qassim
Mohammed & Susannah A. Nesmith, Suicide Bombing Kills 116 in Iraq: The Attack, on
Military and Police Recruits, was the Deadliest Since the Fall of Hussein in 2003, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 1, 2005, at Al (discussing the worst insurgent attack in Iraq in nearly
two years and noting Sunni insurgents' success in driving up the body count); Eric
Schmitt, The Few and the Proud Fret About the 'Few,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A19
(noting Marine recruiter concerns that "the 'Falluja effect'-a steady drumbeat of
military casualties from Iraq, punctuated by graphic televised images of urban combat[has] sear[ed] an image into the public eye" that has strongly impacted public opinion
and military recruitment numbers).
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965). See also Jonathan Finer,
Security Contracts in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005,
at Al.
290. See infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text.
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the case, in arguing a strict liability or negligence theory of
recovery the plaintiffs would argue that they received no
extensive AT training and therefore were more likely to suffer
the harms that they did, in fact, suffer. Thus, since they were
not provided proper AT training they could not form the
required level of understanding to appreciate the dangers they
were waiving. In other words, the injuries the plaintiffs suffered
were directly attributable to the lack of information and AT
training offered by the parent contracting company. Indeed,
inadequate and nonexistent training has been cited frequently
by contractors in Iraq as an ongoing and potentially dangerous
problem.2 9'
In addition, plaintiffs can claim, as in Nordan, that they
relied on the defendant's promises of proper AT training and
force protection in making their decision to sign the subject
contract. In Nordan, the four men could allege that the parent
company neglected their duty to provide AT training and force
protection, or engaged in intentional fraud (perhaps in the
interest of greater profits) to induce the plaintiffs to enter the
contract. Stated specifically, fraud in the inducement applies
when the defendant knowingly makes a false representation of a
292
material fact, intending that action to be acted upon.
Additionally, the plaintiff must have incurred damages in its
293
reasonable reliance and action upon the false representation.
In the event that fraud in the inducement of a contract is found,
the court orders rescission of the entire contract. In short, the
so-called "iron clad" contract is gone.
At the end of the day, the repercussions of any lawsuit to the
company can
extend far beyond
parent contracting
compensatory or even punitive damages. The injury to
reputation can impact negatively on developing new business
contacts and cause difficulty in recruiting new hires.

291. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 31-32.
292. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
293. Id.
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VI. PERSONNEL RECOVERY

Preserving the lives and well-being of.. . contractorsplaced in
danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or
having to evade while participatingin U.S.-sponsored activities
or missions
294 is one of the highest prioritiesof the Department of
Defense.

DOD Instruction 1300.23
As stated, contractors who have "fallen into the power of the
enemy" during an international armed conflict are considered
POWs and are to be afforded all the protections of the Geneva
Conventions. 295 As such, during captivity the contractor is now a

POW and must receive adequate food, water, shelter, and
clothing.296 Following the cessation of active hostilities between
the two warring parties, the contractor must be released.297
Toward this end, DOD policy requires that:
Before entering a theater of operation or an area of
responsibility, identified [DOD] civilian employees,
[DOD] contractors (under the terms of the contract),
and other designated personnel shall know their
personal legal status under the Geneva Conventions.
Knowledge of their personal legal status shall assist
those who become captured or isolated to apply properly
the rights and privileges afforded to them under
international law. 8
Ironically, DOD issued this broad-reaching Instruction on
ta
August
20, 2003, 299 more
thanconflict
three months
the cessation
of the international
armed
in Iraq after
and almost
three

294. DOD INST. No. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 4.1.

295. See Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. For POW status
to attach, contractors must "have received authorization from the armed forces which
they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card. .. ." Id.
296. Id. arts. 25-27.
297. Id. art. 118. Article 118 states, "Prisoners of war shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." Id.
298. DOD INST. No. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 4.3.
299. Id.
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years after the beginning of the international armed conflict in
Afghanistan.30 0 Still, since most of the contractor casualties in
the War on Terror have not occurred during the rather brief
periods
of international armed conflict against totalitarian
•
301
regimes,
international law of war protections are not
applicable.
The vast majority of contractor deaths, kidnappings, and
302
woundings have occurred during MOOTW missions,
particularly in the context of the ongoing terror attacks by alQa'eda, insurgents, and other criminals. In contingency
operations, civilians accompanying the force represent easy
targets for enemy forces set on hostage-taking. 3 There is no
question that the terrorists recognize the propaganda value of
exploiting the media and sensationalizing the kidnappings. 4
Because contractors are typically unarmed, have little
knowledge of, or training in evasion techniques (that is, no AT
training), and may receive only incidental protection from
combatant personnel, the risk of capture is often high. 305 Once
captured, many are viciously tortured and murdered. 6

300. See Steven Lee Myers & Thorn Shanker, A Nation Challenged:Military; Large
U.S. Force Is Assembling as Bush Decides How to Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at
B1 (describing preparations for war in Afghanistan); Threats and Responses: Bush's
Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003,
at A14 (warning of impending military action against Iraq).
301. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
302. See State Department Issues Travel Warning on Columbia, U.S FED NEWS,
Jan. 18, 2006 (noting the fact that Marxist rebels in Colombia kidnap American
contractors as well as tourists).
303. According to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, a website which maintains a
comprehensive list of combatant and noncombatant statistics including the numbers of
contractors killed and missing in Iraq, at least 14 contractors currently have the status
"missing." Many more have been killed. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, available at
http://icasualties.orgoif/Civ.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (on file with Author) (site
now reflects current number missing).
304. See Rod Nordland, In Fear Ridden Baghdad, No Place is Safe, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 4, 2004, at 30. Not only are Americans targeted, but foreigners have been taken
hostage in Iraq and murdered as well. Id. at 31.
305. See generally supra Part III.
306. See, e.g., Steven Fainaru & Karl Vick, British Hostage's Beheading Confirmed
by Family, Video; Insurgents in Iraq Had Killed Engineer's Colleagues, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 2004, at A12 (describing when Iraqi terrorists abducted contractors Kenneth
Bigley, Jack Hensely, and Eugene "Jack" Armstrong in September 2004-all of whom

HOUSTON JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 28:2

Although the terrorist attacks are not considered to be
under the umbrella of any international set of rules, the
distinction has little meaning to al-Qa'eda-like terror groups
who have no regard for any civilized rules regulating armed
conflict. Terrorists, insurgents, and criminal gangs who prey
upon contractors do not subscribe to the law of war or civilized
behavior, thereby making the protections afforded by any rule of
law hollow, with little practical or perceived value. °7
Considering the prospect of torture and other violence likely to
befall the captured civilian
contractor,
the issue of personnel
•
.
308
recovery is a pressing matter.
While a primary purpose of AT training is to provide
contractors with the skills necessary to avoid capture, it is also
concerned with providing skills to allow them to cope with
possible capture and return to U.S. control. 30 9 Thus, AT training
should always be viewed as a venue for SERE training. The very
purpose of AT training is to avoid potential threats.
It is DOD policy: that [p]reserving the lives and wellbeing of U.S. military, [DOD] civilian and contract
service employees placed in danger of being isolated,
beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade
while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or
mission is one of the highest priorities of the
Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has
a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent
exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce
the potential for captured personnel being used as
leverage against the United States.1 0

were later brutally murdered by their captors).
307. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 27, at xvi (recognizing that the radical Islamic
terrorists make "no distinction between military and civilian targets").
308. See Roxana Tiron, Pentagon Seeks Joint Doctrine, Training for Personnel
Recovery, NAT'L DEF., Nov. 2004, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
issues/2004/Nov/JointDoctrine.htm (noting that the usual stakes inherent in personnel
recovery have heightened in light of the increasingly common abduction of civilian
contractors in Iraq).
309. See id. The use of the contract to delineate the scope and amount of contractor
training (or lack thereof) is not limited to personnel recovery. See AT Training, supra
Part IV.
310. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.2, supra note 3, para. 4.

2006]

CONTRA CTORS ON THE "BATTLEFIELD"

Nevertheless, it is no secret that personnel recovery matters
are fragmented and a National Security Presidential Directive is
sorely needed. 31' Although the military has attempted to recover
captured contractors in Iraq, 12 whether such a rescue attempt is
made may not only be limited by operational constraints (for
instance, a lack of intelligence as to the location of the
contractor), 313 but also due to a lack of clear, high-level
guidance.3 14 Each military service plan for individual operations,
the training/preparation for such operations3 5 and even the
terminology is defined differently. Indeed, the term "personnel
recovery" is defined
differently
within
the military
316
establishment.
One source defines personnel recovery as
follows:
[A]ggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to
recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing
personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and
denied areas. Personnel recovery may occur through
military
action,
action
by
non-governmental
organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action,
and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination
of these options.3 17

311. See IDA Report, supra note 23.
312. See, e.g., Mark Sage, Iraq: The Aftermath: US Troops in Two Failed Attempts
to Save Bigley, INDEP. (London), Oct. 13, 2004, at 5 (detailing two unsuccessful attempts
by American soldiers to find and free civilian contractors Kenneth Bigley, Jack Hensley,
and Eugene Armstrong before their deaths).
313. See Tiron, supra note 308 (noting that the urban environment in Iraq makes
it easy for terrorists to hide kidnapped personnel).
314. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at 8.
315. There exists no dedicated military force for personnel recovery; in fact,
ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have spread current recovery forces
perilously thin. See Tiron, supra note 308 (noting that the War on Terror places an
emphasis in "primary combat tasks").
316. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at 4 (proposing the definition of personnel
recovery: "the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the
recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors who
become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities
abroad, and of other persons designated by the President"). Note that this definition is
broad, as the term "U.S. sponsored activities" is not limited to the battlefield. See supra
note 3 (defining personnel recovery).
317. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 2310.2, supra note 3, para. 3 (Note
that the word "contractor" is rarely included in this pre-War on Terror instruction).
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In effect, the term "personnel recovery" is an umbrella term
that envisions a combination of military, civil, and political
efforts united to obtain the immediate release of those detained
against their will or isolated from a hostile environment either
via coordinated negotiation or forcible recovery. 31"
Given the current high-risk environments of not only Iraq
and Afghanistan, but also of places like Colombia and other
hostile zones around the globe, one might conclude that all
personnel recovery operations will be conducted by either the
Air Force or Special Operations Forces (SOF). 31 9 This is not the
case. While SOF forces provide flexibility as well as the unique
knowledge and equipment required for high-risk, personnel
recovery missions,32 ° there is no "dedicated" personnel recovery
force. Based on each case, the Combatant Commander will rely
on a combination of assets to form a rescue mission. The muchpublicized April 2003 rescue of Jessica Lynch does not represent
the model for recovery operations,3 21 although in that personnel
recovery operation SOF soldiers successfully rescued Private
Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital during a nighttime raid
without suffering a single American casualty.3 22
The use of the military to conduct personnel recovery
missions is defined, in part, by the DOD policy on NonConventional Assisted Recovery, which covers not only U.S.
military personnel but also "DOD civilian employees, contractors
and other designated personnel isolated during military
318. See Tiron, supra note 308.
319. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Role of Special OperationsForces in the
War on Terror, in THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 158 (John Davis ed., 2004). Congress
created the United States Special Operations Command in 1987 to function as a
separate unified command for all the services' special operation forces. Id. "Often
operating in secret, these uniquely selected and extremely well trained fighters are
tasked to perform unique wartime and peacetime missions... ." Id.
320. See Linda Robinson, The Silent Warriors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14,
2003, at 28.
321. See Keith B. Richburg, Iraqis Say Lynch Raid Faced No Resistance, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A17. Jessica Lynch, a supply clerk in the Army's 507"'
Maintenance Company, was kidnapped on March 23, 2003 by Iraqi forces. Id.
322. See Robert Wall, Rescue of a POW, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 14,
2003, at 29 (describing the sophisticated and well-coordinated personnel recovery
mission that included the use of aircraft not only to create a diversion, but also to
provide close air support).
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operations or as a direct result of developing or ongoing crisis
prior to U.S. military intervention., 323 The significance of this
DOD Instruction cannot be overstated for two reasons. First, the
DOD Instruction specifically includes, by its terms, "contractors"
as a covered entity without limitations or qualification (that is,
under the terms of the contract).3 24 Second, the DOD
Instruction's applicability is broad-arguably, by using the term
"military operations," the policy accounts for personnel recovery
operations in both war and MOOTW.325 As such, NonConventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) encompasses:
All forms of personnel recovery conducted by an entity,
group of entities, or organizations that are trained and
directed to contact, authenticate, support, move and
exfiltrate U.S. military and other designated personnel
from enemy-held or hostile areas to friendly control
through established infrastructure procedures. NAR
includes unconventional assisted recovery.
Though frequently the result of hostilities, personnel
recovery options are not limited to hostilities per se:
The scope of persons for whom the United States will
undertake Personnel Recovery is not limited to
situations involving hostile action or circumstances
suggestive of hostile action. Personnel Recovery
measures may be initiated for personnel (U.S., allied, or
coalition) who become unaccounted for as a result of
training exercises, operations other than war wherein
hostile action is not involved and operational
environments not involving hostile action.
Individuals who become missing as a result of nonhostile
action do not automatically gain the benefits of personnel
recovery operations initiated on their behalf.328 DOD policy
323. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INST. No. 2310.6, NON-CONVENTIONAL ASSISTED
RECOVERY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, para. 1 (2000).
324. Id.
325. See id.
326. Id. para. 3. Unconventional Assisted Recovery is NAR conducted by Special
Operations Forces. Id.
327. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INST. No. 2310.5, ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PERSONS
para. E3.1.6 (2000).
328. Id.
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provides that "the specific persons for whom Personnel Recovery
may be initiated will vary based upon the circumstances unique
to each situation."3 9
While the implementing regulations are the province of
DOD, Congress has provided the statutory framework within
which DOD conceptualizes and formulates personnel recovery
policy specifically and missing person policy more generally. The
Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner of
War/Missing Personnel Office pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1501:
The Secretary of Defense shall establish within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense an office to have
responsibility for Department of Defense Policy relating
Subject to the authority,
to missing persons ....
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the
responsibilities of the office shall include ... policy,
control, and oversight.., of the entire process for
investigation and recovery related to missing persons
(including matters related to search, rescue, escape,
and evasion) .. .
The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
(DPMO) is charged with coordinating the full range of policy
issues associated with personnel recovery throughout DOD and
the interagency community.3 3'
Perhaps more significantly for the civilian contractor,
Congress defines the term "missing person" to mean:
[A] member of the armed forces on active duty who is in
a missing status; or a civilian employee of the
Department of Defense or an employee of a contractor
of the Department of Defense who serves in direct
support of, or accompanies, the armed forces in the field
332
under orders and who is in a missing status.

329. Id.
330. 10 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000).
331. See DPMO, supra note 3 (click on "DOD and DOS Cooperation on Personnel
(last
DPMO-Mission, http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/leadership/mission.htm
Recovery");
visited Feb. 5, 2006).
332. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1513(1)(a)-(b) (2002). The term "missing status" is defined as
"the status of a missing person who is determined to be absent in a category of any one of
the following: [missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured,
beleaguered, besieged, detained in a foreign country against that person's will.]" Id.
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Contractors are also considered "covered persons" for the
purposes of DOD action to investigate the circumstances of their
absence and, possibly, to evaluate and implement personnel
recovery options.3 33 As a result, 10 § U.S.C 1502 states:
After receiving information that the whereabouts and
status of a [covered] person.. .is uncertain and that the
absence of the person may be involuntary, the
commander of the unit, facility, or area to or in which
the person is assigned shall make a preliminary
assessment of the circumstances. If, as a result of that
assessment, the commander concludes that the person
is missing, the commander shall.., recommend that
the person be placed in missing status[ ] and...
transmit a report containing that recommendation to
the Secretary concerned ....
The application of the statute to personnel recovery provides
some overarching bright-lines and the opportunity for
Congressional supervision, but does not limit or preclude the
need for more clarification of personnel recovery vis-a-vis
the
• 331
specific and increasingly important role of the contractor.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have yet to know the full extent of contractor activity across
the interagency in high-risk overseas locations around the world
336
on any given day.
IDA Report
There can be no doubt that the use of civilian contractors by
the modern U.S. military is an absolute necessity for successful
mission accomplishment. This is certainly true in the context of
the War on Terror, but also in other contingency operations from
South America to the Far East. Unfortunately, "the regulatory

§ 1513(2).
333. Id. § 1501(c)(2).
334. Id. § 1502.
335. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(n) (setting out the duties of the
parent contracting company to notify next of kin in the event a contractor dies or is
"missing, captured, or abducted").
336. IDA Report, supra note 23, at F-5.
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scheme governing civilians accompanying the force is in a rapid
state of flux ' 3 37 and DOD lacks a "comprehensive policy to ensure
that contractors are adequately protected... or that the risks to
them are adequately managed in high-threat, overseas
locations."3 38 In fact, most of the regulatory guidance dealing
with civilians accompanying the military was written prior to
the War on Terror. 39
At the time of writing this article, the U.S. House of
Representatives has recognized a number of the shortcomings in
the areas of civilian contractors and personnel recovery, and
have taken steps to address some of these gaps with House Bill
1815. 340 In a military appropriations bill introduced by
Representative Duncan Hunter of California on April 26, 2005,
one section of the bill recognizes the necessity of contractor
support on the battlefield and offers clarification and definition
of the roles of contractors and the military in light of current
exigencies. Section 1603 provides much needed definitions of
terms such as "contractor[s] accompanying the force"341 and
"contractor[s] not accompanying the force."3 42 Additionally, the
bill orders the Secretary of Defense to work closely with
commanders of combatant command to determine the proper
protection levels needed to protect all types of battlefield
contractors.34 3 Moreover, the bill sets up a communication and

337. LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOL. I, CENTER FOR
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 172 (2004); see also Jonathan Finer, Security
Contractorsin Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, at Al
(discussing the increasing scrutiny over the actions of security contractors in Iraq after a
number of incidents involving "indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness [that]
have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight"). For example, Brig. Gen. Karl R.
Horst, the deputy commander of the Third Infantry Division, noted that "there's no
authority over [security contractors], so you can't come down on them hard when they
escalate force." Id. One hopes that a more clearly defined regulatory scheme will benefit
both the military, who will no longer have to futilely police the actions of contractors
outside of their realm of authority, and contractors in Iraq, who have grown increasingly
restless in the wake of violence against contractors in the last two years in Iraq.
338. IDA Report, supranote 23, at F-1.
339. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
340. H.R. 1815 109th Cong. (2005).
341. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. §§ 1603(a)(1)-(2).
342. Id.
343. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. § 1604(a)(1).
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intelligence-sharing framework between military command and
contractors to ensure that all parties are aware of, and prepared
for, all threats and contingencies that arise in a war zone.3 44 The
bill even empowers the Secretary of Defense to enact regulations
that govern civilian contractors' ability to carry and use certain
weapons for self-defense and while performing contract work.34 5
The proposals enumerated in the bill are all positive steps in the
right direction; however, there is far more that needs to be done.
As one commentator recently noted, House Bill 1815 "merely
creates an accounting of private contractors-not accountability
for private contractors and their parent companies."3 6
Another encouraging development in terms of advancing the
issues associated with civilian contractors is the June 2005
DFARS. 347 This DFARS addresses questions regarding
governmental responsibility to contractors deployed on
contingency operations overseas, defining their duties in
relation to DOD and setting out specific required language in all
such contracts.3 48 Likewise, the October 2005 DOD Instruction
3020.41 created a comprehensive source for the DOD procedures
dealing with CDF. 349 This dialogue is encouraging, but more
needs to be done.
Mitigating the risk of capture or injury to civilian
contractors is a shared responsibility of the United States and
the parent contracting company. Not only does DOD need to
fully develop an institutional approach to contractor force
protection, it is imperative that parent contracting companies
develop a better system of providing the necessary AT training
to their employees that are sent to high-risk overseas locations.
Until the government develops a systemic approach 350 (that is,
344. Id.
345. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. § 1605(a).
346. Marc P. Miles, Speech Given at the Contractors on the Battlefield Conference,
San Antonio, Texas (June 28, 2005) (on file with Author).
347. See DFARS, supra note 51.
348. See id.
349. See DOD INST. 3020.41, supra note 17, at para. 6.
350. See generally Kahn & Schwartz, supra note 165 (discussing the lack of a
systemic manner to deal with the growing violence in Iraq); Finer, supra note 289
(reporting on the growing concern that lack of oversight is leading to recklessness and
lawlessness by certain security contractors in Iraq).
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providing the full range of force protection training at military
pre-deployment sites), the prudent parent contracting company
will ensure that their personnel have the necessary information
to prepare them for the exigencies of their overseas
assignments. At a minimum this means that the parent
company should include an appropriate level of AT training so
that contractors are better able to avoid or survive capture
and/or injury when operating in high-risk environments.

